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I.

Sl/ashes

Violence mediates all relationships between lesbians and law.
Yet when most legal scholars invite me to talk or write about violence
and lesbians and law, they want ampersands and not slashes; they want
sparks and not charred remains. I am invited as lesbian evidence toward
the credentialling of a conference or collection as inclusive of all feminist
perspectives. I am invited to provide the "new" perspective, to speak
about violence among women and how the law can (better) address this
problem.1 Yet in the feminist context, this is problematic. Violence
among lesbians is a violent divergence from the feminist jurisprudential
attempt to reconceptualize the law and expose its gendered violence. For
many feminists, the problem of violence is the problem of men's
dominance over women, a dominance often enforced with overt violence
and always enforced with subtle promises of violence.2 For some of these
Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law at Queens College. B.A., Ramapo College, 1976; J.D.,
Stetson University, 1979; LL.M., University of California, Berkeley, 1990. Parts of this work appear in
LESBIAN (Otrr)LAw (1992). The author wishes to express her appreciation to S.E. Valentine, Joyce E.
McConnell, and Leslie Thrope, as well as to Victoria Neilson, the staff of the Teras Journal of Women
and the Law, and the participants in the New Perspectives on Women and Violence Symposium (Austin,
Texas, Mar. 6-7, 1992).
1. I do not mean to imply that I do not think this is an important issue. See Ruthann Robson,
Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law & Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GoLuEN GATE U. L. REv.
567 (1990).
2. The theorist most often associated with this point of view is Catharine MacKinnon, whose rhetoric
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feminists, violence among lesbians is merely an instance of lesbians
appropriating male values. 3 Whatever the explanation, however, after
this provocative lesbian interlude, the agenda can return to the "real"
problem of men's violence against women.
Given this common occurrence, I am appreciative of the editors and
staff at the Texas Journal of Women and the Law, especially the feminist
women and men who engineered the March 1992 symposium, New
Perspectiveson Women and Violence, and encouraged work on the broader
aspects of violence and women, including lesbians. To a great extent, my
concerns about lesbian violence do overlap with even the most narrow
feminist attention to male dominance and violence against women.
Lesbians are not immune from the violence some men routinely exhibit
toward women in intimate situations simply because we often inhabit a
private realm without men. 4 While our experience of male violence is
often neither private nor intimate, we experience male violence in public
places like streets or workplaces. My present concern, however, is less
about legal responses to male violence against lesbians than about the legal
regime's own expressions of violence towards lesbianism. That the law is
violent towards lesbianism cannot be seriously disputed: the law
criminalizes our sexual activities, 5 excludes us from what it considers to
be the ultimate sanction of citizenship, 6 and denies us protections. 7 Even
when a particular law implicitly discourages private8 violence against
lesbians, it exhibits the law's violence toward lesbians.
Nevertheless, I do not wish to posit lesbians as victims of the violence

typically includes passages like the following:
All women live in sexual objectification the way fish live in water. Given the statistical
realities, all women live all the time under the shadow of the threat of sexual abuse ....
Given the statistical realities, much of women's sexual lives will occur under post-traumatic
stress.
CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 149 (1989).

3. According to Catharine MacKinnon, lesbians cannot do otherwise than appropriate male values.
For MacKinnon, sexuality may be "so gender marked that it carries dominance and submission with it,
whatever the gender of its participants." Id. at 142. Further, since "sexuality is violent, so perhaps
violence is sexual." Id. at 179. Thus, "[w]henever women are victimized, regardless of the biology of
the perpetrator," the gendered system of dominance and submission that is patriarchy is at work. Id.
4. Lesbians do not always inhabit a private realm without men. Lesbians may live with their parents,
with other relatives, or with their children and can experience violence. There are reported instances of
parents procuring men to rape their daughters in order to facilitate a "cure," as well as of children so
disturbed by a mother's lesbianism to attempt murder. GARY D. COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AOAINST
LEsBiANs AND GAY MEN 201 n.63, 207-08 n.71 (1991).
5. For a discussion of the crimes of lesbian sex, see RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW:
SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 47-59 (1992).
6. For a discussion of lesbians and military service, see id. at 91-99; infra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of lesbians and discrimination doctrine, see RoBsoN, supra note 5, at 81-90.
8. See infra notes 42-70 and accompanying text (discussing the federal Hate Crime Statistics Act).
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of laws or men. I want to claim violence as an attribute of lesbianism.
This claim is not based on incidences of violence between lesbians, but on
the existence of lesbians as violent denials to the law's system of
heterosexual and male hegemony. Lesbians exist only as slashes, only as
ashes, within the dominant legal discourse. In one sense, this Article is a
kind of violence. There will be no paragraph outlining what this Article
will explore/examine/analyze. 9 The verbs I am more interested in are
verbs like incinerate, burn, and blaze. The last section of this Article
considers arson.
II. Li(v)es Between the Slashes
Arguably, all categories are a kind of violence. They operate to
exclude and include, to totalize by repressing differences, and to insist on
their own authority. Classical category theory is based on a perception that
items within the category have shared properties, while cognitive category
theory is based on a perception that prototypes within the category order
categorization. 10 Nevertheless, both classical and cognitive theories of
categorization share an implicit understanding that categorization enforces
reality. 1 Similarly, the postmodernist critique of language, often known

9. Like many trained in the law, I have enumerated those verbs on a yellow legal pad and kept them
handy for articles and pieces of advocacy. I have used and re-used those verbs so often that I have
internalized their violent strictures. However, what I desire is new verbs that are lesbian-generated and
do not assimilate lesbianism to legal activities, but express legalities in terms of lesbian activities.
10. Classical categorization theory can be briefly summarized as follows:
From the time of Aristotle to the later work of Wittgenstein, categories were thought to be
well understood and unproblematic. They were assumed to be abstract containers, with
things either inside or outside the category. Things were assumed to be in the same category
if and only if they had certain properties in common. And the properties they had in
common were taken as defining the category.
GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGs: WHAT CATEGORIES REvEAL ABOUT THE

MIND 6 (1987). On the other hand, cognitive prototype categorization theory suggests that
human categorization is essentially a matter of both human experience and imagination-of
perception, motor activity, and culture on the one hand, and of metaphor, metonymy, and
mental imagery on the other. As a consequence, human reason crucially depends on the
same factors, and therefore cannot be characterized merely in terms of the manipulation of
abstract symbols.
Id. at 8.
11. As Lakoffexplains:
To change the very concept of a category is to change not only our concept of the mind, but
also our understanding of the world. Categories are categories of things. Since we
understand the world not only in terms of individual things but also in terms of categories
of thirngs, we tend to attribute a real existence to those categories. We have categories for
biological species, physical substances, artifacts, colors, kinsmen, and emotions and even
categories of sentences, words, and meanings. We have categories for everything we can
think about. To change the concept of category itself is to change our understanding of the
world. At stake is our understanding of everything from what a biological species ... is to
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as deconstruction, has revealed that every text exists in relation to that
which it seeks to silence and is thus ultimately undermined by that very
silence. 12 For example, the feminist critique of feminist theorizing has
revealed that many exhortations of "woman" have been falsely essentialist
or partial in racist and classist manners.' 3 Therefore, violences are
inherent in categorization, as well as in reason, conceptual thinking, and
language. They are often conjoined with political violence: the power to
determine what marks insanity, intelligence, or integrity becomes the
power to punish or reward persons with institutionalization, education, or
publication. In addition to these inherent violences, the categories of
lesbian, violence, and law each perpetuate their own particular types of
violence. These violences are made even more particular when considered
in relation to each other.
A.

The Category of LESBIAN
An important particularity within the category of lesbian is the

violence of silence. There is no language for the category of lesbian, for
the language of this category is that of nonlesbian colonizers. 1 4 As
lesbian theorist Marilyn Frye notes:
The use of the word 'lesbian' to name us is a quadrifold evasion, a
laminated euphemism. To name us, one goes by reference to the island
of Lesbos, which in turn is an indirect reference to the poet Sappho
(who used to live there, they say), which in turn is an indirect reference
to what fragments of her poetry have survived a few millennia of
patriarchy, and this in turn (if we have not lost you by now) is a
prophylactic avoidance of direct mention of the sort of creature who
would write such poems or to whom such poems would be written.

what a word is ....
Id. at 9.
12. See, e.g., JONATHAN CULLER, ON D ECONSTRUCTION 86 (1982) (stating that "to deconstruct a
discourse is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts").
M
13. See, e.g., DENISE RILEY, "AM I THAT NAmE?": FEMINISM AND THE CATEGORY OF "VOMEN"
IN HISTORY 4 (1988) (arguing that "woman" is invoked too often when more accurate and delimiting
descriptions could be used); EUZABEH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTlAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
IN FEMtnnsTTHouorr 158 (1988) (suggestingthat the concept of an essential "womanness" makes women
inessential because the details of their individual experiences are irrelevant). Interestingly, neither of these
works considers the heterosexist implications of the category "woman" in feminist theory.
14. I am using the metaphor of colonizers here in recognition of the colonizing practice of substituting
the colonizers' language for the native language. As Jacques Derrida notes, "[ln many countries, in the
past and in the present, one founding violence of the law or of the imposition of state law has consisted
in imposing a language on national or ethnic minorities regrouped by the state." Jacques Derrida, Force
ofLaw: The "Mystical Foundationof Authority," 11 CARtozo L. Rsv. 920, 957 (1990). Colonization
is a metaphor rather than an accurate description, however, because lesbians exist within a dominant
heterosexual culture and as a part of other shared cultural conditions. For a discussion of domestication
as a preferred term, see infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.

1993]

Incendiary Categories

* assuming you happen to know what is in those poems written in a
dialect of Greek over tvwo thousand five hundred years ago on a small
15
island somewhere in the wine dark Aegean Sea.

Present debates about the category "lesbian" in postmodernist influenced
"queer theory" can also silence the assertion of the category in a violent
16
manner, hypothesizing instability outside of quotation marks.
Another particularity is the violence of dominance, especially as
exhibited in language as a political manifestation of race and class.
"Lesbian" theorist Gloria Anzaldia notes:
For me the term lesbian es un problemon. As a working class Chicana,

mestiza-a composite being, amalgama de culturas y de lenguas-a
woman who loves women, "lesbian" is a cerebral word, white and
middle class, representing an English-only dominant culture, derived

from the Greek word lesbos. I think of lesbians as predominantly white
and middle-class women and a segment of women of color who acquired
the term through osmosis much the same as Chicanas and Latinas
assimilated the word "Hispanic." When a "lesbian" names me the same

as her she subsumes me under her category. I am of her group but not
17
as an equal, not a whole person-my color erased, my class ignored.

The violence may be the violence of obscenity: the category "lesbian"
in a bookstore is a category of obscenity and thus to be violently excluded
from legal respect.1" Or the violence may be the violence of damages:
a woman being categorized as a "lesbian" (or "dyke") is entitled to money
damages to compensate her for this violence against her. 19 Or the
violence may be the violence of child custody: the category of "lesbian"
and the category of "mother" may be violently adjudged as mutually
exclusive.20 Such instances of particularized violences are necessary to
any understanding of the category "lesbian" as well as to determining how
this category exists in relation to the law.21 While lesbian attempts at the
15. MARILYN FRYE, THE PoLmcs OF REALITY 160 (1983).
16. For further discussion, see Ruthann Robson, Embodiment(s): The Possibilitiesof Lesbian Legal
Theory in Bodies Problematizedby Postmodernismsand Fendisnis, 1 LAw & SExUALrY: REv. LESBIAN
& GAY LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 1992); see also infra notes 32, 64.
17. Gloria Anzaldda, To(o) Queer the Writer-Loca, escritoray chicana, in INVERSIONS: WRITINGS
By DYKES, QUEmsR
& LESBIANS 249, 249-50 (Betsy Warland ed., 1991).
18. See Video News, Inc. v. State, 790 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tex.App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1990, no
writ) (affirming the conviction for possession with intent to promote obscene materials of bookstore owner
whose "magazine racks are broken down into sexual preference groups" including "lesbian"); see alsoinfra
note 33 (discussing other obscenity cases).
19. See Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 594 So. 2d 571, 575 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding
verdict and damages for patient who, after being raped by a male nursing assistant in the hospital, suffered
damages, including being called a lesbian and a dyke "by her female peers").
20. See infra notes 146.56 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which a woman's competence
as a mother is questioned because of her lesbianism).
21. See Lucia Folena, Figuresof Violence: Philologists, Witches and Stalinistas, in THE VIOLENCE
OF REP EmTA11ON: LrrERATURE AND THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE 219, 220 (Nancy Armstrong &
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categorization of lesbianism within history, language, and culture are
rooted in violence, the law's categorization of lesbianism is itself a cipher
of violence. Just as the figure of the witch has been an incarnation of
violence,22 the figure of the lesbian is also violently relegated to the
symbolization of violence.
Yet another particularity is the violence attending debates about
lesbians' sexual partners.
Lesbians who have engaged in sexual
relationships with men bemoan the loss of the lesbian label and implicitly
accuse lesbians of too violently patrolling the borders of lesbian
identity.23 This violence coalesces with an often perceived violent
superiority of lesbianism in feminist circles. For example, in a feminist
jurisprudence class, students read Ruth Colker's essay on authenticity in
which she reveals her previous lesbian state and her present involvement
with a man. 24 The heterosexual women in the class expressed a visceral
response to Colker's piece, speaking about their own wish to be lesbians
if only they "could" because "everything would be easier." Because I am
the professor/facilitator, I do not react. But I want to speak of the violence
endured in those lesbian lives where everything is easier. I want to speak
of adolescent lesbians chained to radiators or sent to aversion therapy by
their families, of lesbians assaulted and raped and knifed by gangs of
men.25 Interestingly, as the heterosexual feminists experience the
violence of exclusion, I ground their exclusion on experiences of violence.
The experience of violence that is the law also occurs in the legal
process of categorizing a woman as a lesbian. For example, male
heterosexual judges violently supplant a lesbian's own definition of
lesbianism with their own. As constitutional jurisprudence only permits the
criminalization of acts, not of status, 26 this violent supplanting has direct
legal consequences. For example, the Seventh Circuit could uphold the
Army's regulation disqualifying "homosexuals" as including "an individual
who is an admitted homosexual but as to whom there is no evidence that

Leonard Tennenhouse eds., 1989) (arguing for the necessity of "pluralizing violence, qualifying it,
exploring the local and historical constitution" of levels of violence if we are ever to understand violence).
22. See id. For a discussion of the links between lesbians and witches in legal history, see Ruthann
Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, 5 Wis. WoMEN's L.J. 1, 31-36 (1990).
23. For a discussion of this issue within the context of the lesbian, bisexual, and gay communities,
see Jojet Harper, Lesbians Who Sleep with Men: Only Her HairdresserKnows for Sure, OUTIVEEK 46
(Feb. 11, 1990) (including opinions on the relativist qualities of the categories "lesbian" and "bisexual"
in response to a statistic that 15 out of 20 lesbians have had sexual relations with men).
24. Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality & Self. A PreliminaryInquiry into the Politics of Authenticity,
68 E.U. L. REv. 217 (1988) (reprintedas revised in AT THE BOUNDAIES OF THE LAw 135 (Martha
Fineman & Nancy Thomadsen eds., 1990)).
25. For sources documenting incidents of violence against lesbians, see infra notes 42-47.
26. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (declaring unconstitutional a statute making a
status, namely that of "being addicted to narcotics," a criminal offense).
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they [sic] have engaged in homosexual acts either before or during military
service" and find it applicable to a lesbian who did not admit to lesbian
sexual acts. 27 In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, the court reasoned:
It is true that actual lesbian conduct has not been admitted by the
plaintiff on any particular occasion, and the Army has offered no
evidence of any such conduct. [United States District] Judge Gordon
found no reason to believe that the lesbian admission meant that plaintiff
was likely to commit homosexual acts. We see it differently. Plaintiff's
lesbian acknowledgement, if not an admission of its practice, at least can
rationally and reasonably be viewed as reliable evidence of a desire and
propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. Such an assumption
cannot be said to be without individual exceptions, but it is compelling
evidence that plaintiff has in the past and is likely to again engage in
such conduct. To this extent, therefore, the regulation does not classify
plaintiff based merely upon her status as a lesbian, but upon reasonable
inferences about her probable conduct in the past and in the future. The
Army need not shut its eyes to the practical realities of this situation, nor
be compelled to engage in the sleuthing of soldiers' personal
relationships for evidence of homosexual conduct in order to enforce its
ban on homosexual acts, a ban not challenged here. Plaintiff does not
deny that she has engaged or will engage in homosexual conduct.
Plaintiff has admitted that she has a homosexual desire, but not
necessarily that she intends to commit homosexual acts. The Ariy need
not try to fine tune a regulation to fit a particular lesbian's subjective
thoughts and propensities?
Legal violence is also apparent when the woman disputes any type of
lesbian identity. A common violent strategy is to analyze a woman with
reference to her conformity with gender identity stereotypes. For example,
a Texas criminal appellate court upheld a murder conviction of a female
defendant who denied she was the female victim's lesbian lover based on
trial evidence that the defendant "dressed like a man; kept her hair cut like
a man; wore men's clothing, including men's shoes." 29 The appellate
court was comfortable relying on heterosexual stereotypes to confirm the
defendant's lesbianism, despite the defendant's denials. Another violent
strategy is to analyze a woman according to her conformance to
heterosexual activity. For example, a District of Columbia trial judge
recently interrogated a woman about her sexual partners in an action
seeking to remove her children for abuse and neglect:
The Court: Is there some reason that the two of you slept in one bed?
You are grown women. Is there some reason why?

27. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 457 n.3 (7th Cir. 1989).
28. Id. at 464.
29. Perez v. State, 491 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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limitation of space.
The Court: You know, we could probably get a clearer understanding
of exactly what is the big mystery in this case if you could give me a
very truthful straight answer to one question.
Witness: Yes.
The Court: Do you have a sexual relationship with Gail Jones.
Witness: I have never.
The Court: Well, then, let me approach it from another way ....
Since
Ms. Gail Jones moved in your home five years ago... and the two of
you have slept in the same bed for five years ... have you had sexual
relations with any males?
Witness: No.
The Court: No women?

Witness: No.
The Court: So, you have made a monastery of your home since that

time?30
Although the trial judge found there was not enough evidence to justify a

finding of lesbianism and was ultimately reversed by an appellate court for
evidencing bias, the trial judge was comfortable making assumptions about
relationships between heterosexual activity and lesbianism.
As a participant in the rule of law-a complicit attorney and law
professor-I have also perpetrated the violence of the lesbian category. As
I was doing initial research for the book that would become Lesbian
(Out)Law,31 I did a word search on both LEXIS and WESTLAW in all
fields of inquiry. I searched for the word "lesbian." My search retrieved

more documents than I had anticipated, most of them less than five years
old.32 As I read through the documents, I discarded two types of cases
that occurred frequently. In one type, the word "lesbian" was highlighted
as part of a book title or book description and the case was an obscenity
prosecution. 33 In the other type, the word "lesbian" was highlighted as
30. In re J.A. & L.A., 601 A.2d 69, 77 n.7 (D.C. 1991).
31. RoBsON, supra note 5.
32. This marks a change from what lesbian legal theorist Rhonda Rivera noted as methodological
problems in conducting legal research on lesbian and gay legal issues in the 1970s, As Rivera stated,
"(Flor years most indexes never had a single topic listing for homosexuality . . . . [Jiudges in their
opinions for a variety of reasons may choose never to use the word homosexuality... and cases involving
homosexual issues are unpublished more often than are cases involving other issues." Rhonda R. Rivera,
Our Straight-LacedJudges: The Legal Position of Honzosexual Personsin the United States, 30 HASTrNOs
L.J. 799, 804-05 (1979). Because of the pioneering efforts of Professor Rivera, among others, my own
research has been considerably less methodologically complicated. Nevertheless, the violences of silence
to which Rivera referred persist.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Osbome, 935 F.2d 32, 38 (4th Cir. 1991) (using defendant's admission
that he had a preference for viewing videotapes of girls age 13-17 engaging in lesbian acts to rebut
affirmative defense of entrapment in prosecution for receiving child pornography through the mails).
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part of a man's words as he assaulted or murdered his "girlfriend," female

lover, or wife,34 or as an accusation raised in incest situations.35
Months after I discarded them, I reconsidered these two types of cases that

I previously had judged as not raising issues of "real" lesbians. The
violence of the category "lesbian" is pertinent to prove obscenity. The
violence of the category "lesbian" is pertinent to prove male physical
violence toward women. Within the legal system, one violence proves
another.
Yet my own exercise in violent categorization allowed me to claim
ownership of the category of lesbian and decide what should count and
what would not. Based on appellate court opinions-multifold distortions
of facts- 61 was temporarily comfortable with deciding questions of
identity and lesbianism, of making violent cleavages between those whom
I would count and those whom I would not.
B.

The Category of VIOLENCE

Violence as physical and individual is the prototypical instance of
violence. The issue for the law in such instances becomes whether or not
it will intervene in such private incidences. 37 Of course, the mere

34. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Williams, 571 N.E.2d 29,31 N(Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (involving a
defendant appealing his murder conviction.on the basis of an irrational fixation on his wife's lesbian
relationship); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. 1979) (involving a wife's description
of her violent husband's accusing her visiting friend of being a lesbian and ordering her to leave their
apartment as part of testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome); see also State v. Strickland, 361
S.E.2d 882, 883 (D.C. 1987) (discussing a husband who murders his estranged wife's minister after saying
that he had heard the minister was a lesbian and that he would "get" her).
35. See, e.g., People v. Votava, 584 N.E.2d 980, 986 (Mass. App. CL 1991) (involving a defendant
who accused his fifteen-year-old daughter of being a lesbian in the course of physically beating her and
molesting her); Chamberlain v. State, 687 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (involving a defendant
convicted of sexual assault on his fifteen-year-old daughter attempting to vacate his conviction on the
grounds that "his wife, and two other women alleged to be his wife's lesbian lovers conspired to file the
sexual assault charge").
36. See David L Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Eploring the Epirical
Component of ConstitutionalInterpretation,139 U. PA. L. REv. 541 (1991) (discussing social science facts
and how they are manipulated in constitutional adjudication); Rachel N. Pine, Speculationand Realily: The
Role of Facts in JudicialProtection of Fundameztal Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 655 (1988) (discussing
empirical facts in opposition to assumed facts in constitutional cases); Holly B. Fechner, Note, Toward an
Expanded Conception of Law Reform Seual Harassnentind the Reconstruction of Facts,23 U. MicH.
J.L. REP. 475 (1990) (discussing the social construction of facts and how courts have used facts in sexual
harassment suits); Emmet T. Flood, Note, Fact ConstructionandJudgment in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
100 YALE L. J. 1795 (1991) (discussing how "facts" transform into 'the facts" in adjudication); see also
Michael E. Tigar, Discovering YourLitigator's Voice, 16 Lrrio., Summer 1990, at 1, 1 (describing facts
in appellate court opinions as "those shadowy trial facts put through a judicial Cuisinart to adorn the
judges' opinion").
37. See, eg., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991)
(exploring the impact that traditional conceptions of privacy have had upon the criminal prosecution of men
who batter women).

10
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categorization of such violence as private and individual can be a
manifestation of violence, including the violences of sexism and
3

homophobia. 9
The law has begun to recognize incidents of violence against lesbians
qua lesbians, including judicial rejection of the "homosexual panic
defense," 39 and passage of statutes that enhance penalties for crimes
motivated by bias.4° Another recognition is manifested by the attempt to
officially calculate incidents of bias related crimes through passage of laws
generically known as hate crime statistics acts. Many states have recently
mandated the collection of statistics, at times including sexual orientation,
and at times deleting or omitting it. 41
In 1990 the United States
38. One of the most startling examples of sexist violence I have encountered appears in a recent
theoretical piece distinguishing between private violence and collective violence. While the author defines
collective violence as "the kind of violence that is practiced by one group on another and that pertains to
individuals, as agents or as victims, only by virtue of their (perceived) association with a particular group,"
and uses racism as exemplar, the author specifically excludes violence against women:
[Collective violence] is quite unlike private violence, for example, domestic violence or street
violence, in which the victims are selected by the attacker because of some relationship the
attacker has to the victim or because of something about the victim that makes him or her a
desirable target, such as having money or being a woman (rape). Except in unusual or
bizarre cases, and making the usual necessary allowances for borderline cases, group
membership (e.g., in a racial or religious group) is not the sole or the crucial factor, as it is
with collective violence.
John Ladd, The Idea of Collective Violence, in JUSTICE, LAW, AND VIOLENCE 19, 22 (James B. Brady &
Newton Carver eds., 1991).
39. For example, in the well-publicized murder of Rebecca Wight and attempted murder of Claudia
Brenner while the two lesbians were hiking along the Appalachian Trail, both the trial and appellate courts
disallowed evidence of the defendant's psychosexual history offered to prove provocation in order to reduce
the offense from murder to manslaughter. The courts reasoned that the provocation must be apparent from
the victims' actions alone, and not from the defendant's "history of misfortunes," including his rejection
by women and his mother's sexual preference. The appellate court also unequivocally stated that:
The sight of naked women engaged in lesbian lovemaking is not adequate provocation to
reduce an unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter. It is not an event which
is sufficient to cause a reasonable person to become so impassioned as to be incapable of cool
reflection. A reasonable person would simply have discontinued his observation and left the
scene; he would not kill the lovers. Whatever a person's views about homosexuality, the law
does not condone or excuse the killing of homosexuals any more than it condones the killing
of heterosexuals.
Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364 (Pa. Super. CL 1990) (citations omitted). For a discussion
of the incident by the surviving lesbian, see Claudia Brenner, Eight Bullets, in HATE CRIMES:
CONFROiiNO VtotENCE AGAINST LESBiANs AND GAY MEN I1 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill
eds., 1992).
40. See, eg., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651.6 (1992) and Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (1989-90)
(referring to race, religion, national origin, sex, and sexual orientation as possible sources of bias). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently held the Wisconsin statute unconstitutional pursuant to the first
amendment. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W. 2d 807, 817 (1992) (relying on R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.Ct.
2638 (1992), the court concluded that the statute, which enhanced penalties based upon a finding that a
defendant intentionally selected a victim because of a protected identity, including sexual orientation,
improperly punished a "mental act" rather than criminal conduct). For further discussion of R.A. V., see
infra notes 78-107 and accompanying text.
41. For statutes that include sexual orientation, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 13023 (West 1992) (including
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Congress passed the federal Hate Crime Statistics Act. 42 The Act
provides for the compilation of statistics of hate or bias crimes, specifically
defined as "crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based upon race,
religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity,"43 and marks the first time
sexual orientation as a category has been codified into federal law.
The Act's inclusion of sexual orientation is a testament to the
increasing recognition of violence against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals,

sexual orientation); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-27m (West 1991) (deleting all categories in favor of an
inclusion of all crimes that are "motivated by bigotry and bias"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.19 (West 1992)
(incorporating a 1991 amendment including sexual orientation); IDAHO CODE § 67-2905 (1989) (reporting
on "malicious harassment" crimes as defined in Section 18-7902 of the Idaho Code Report); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 127, para. 55a(31) (West Supp. 1992) (including "hate crimes" as defined under Section 12-7.1
of the Criminal Code of 1961, which includes crimes by reason of sexual orientation); IOWA CODE § 729.5
(1990) (including sexual orientation); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 9(b) (1990) (adding sexual orientation
effective 1991)'; MINN. STAT. § 626.5531 (1990) (including sexual orientation); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.550
(1989) (including sexual orientation). For statutes that omit sexual orientation, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 850 (West Supp. 1992) (omitting sexual orientation, but including "race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin or disability"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 250(i) (West Supp. 1992) (omitting sexual
orientation, but including "race, color, religion, or national origin"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-28-46 (1991)
(omitting sexual orientation, but including crimes 'motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic bigotry or
bias"); VA. CODE ANN. § 52-8.5(c)(l)(Michie 1950) (omitting sexual orientation, but including "race,
religion, or ethnic origin").
42. P.L. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 534) [hereinafter Hate Crime Statistics Act].
The complete text of the act is as follows:

[See. 11
That (a) this Act may be cited as the "Hate Crime Statistics Act."
(b)(1) Under the authority of section 534 of title 28, United States Code the Attorney General shall
acquire data, for the calendar year 1990 and each of the succeeding 4 calendar years, about crimes
that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including
where appropriate the crimes of murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape; aggravated
assault, simple assault, intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage or vandalism of property.
(2) The Attorney General shall establish guidelines for the collection of such data including the
necessary evidence and criteria that must be present for a finding of manifest prejudice and
procedures for carrying out the purposes of this section.
(3) Nothing in this section creates a cause of action or a right to bring an action, including an action
based on discrimination due to sexual orientation. As used in this section, the term "sexual
orientation" means consensual homosexuality or heterosexuality. This subsection does not limit any.
existing cause of action or right to bring an action, including any action under the Administrative
Procedure Act or the All Writs Act.
(4) Data acquired under this section shall be used only for research or statistical purposes and may
not contain any information that may reveal the identity of an individual victim of a crime.
(5) The Attorney General shall publish an annual summary of the data acquired under this section.
(c) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this section through fiscal year 1994.

Sec. 2.
(a) Congress finds that
(1) the American family life is the foundation of American Society,
(2) Federal policy should encourage the well-being, financial security, and health of the American
family,
(3) schools should not de-emphasize the critical value of American family life.
(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed, nor shall any funds appropriated to carry out the purpose
of the Act be used, to promote or encourage homosexuality.

43. Id. § l(b)(1).
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as well as a linking of this violence with the violence perpetrated on the
basis of other group identities such as race, ethnicity, religion, culture, and

gender. 44 Much of this awareness is due to the efforts of the AntiViolence Project of the National Gay & Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF),
which has been documenting incidences of anti-lesbian and anti-gay

violence since 1984. 45 The efforts of the NGLTF have been augmented
by many local anti-violence projects, as well as by some independent
researchers, who have been collecting information since the early
1980s.46 Most researchers agree that reports of anti-lesbian and anti-gay
violence have been increasing in the past few years. 47 Such reports
appear with increasing regularity in the lesbian/gay press. 48 Further,
documentation by lesbian/gay anti-violence projects has garnered the
attention of the mainstream press, 49 which in turn influences the political
44. The increasing awareness of a link between crimes based on sexual orientation and crimes based
on other group identities is reflected in Senator Cranston's introduction of the bill that would become the
Hate Crime Statistics Act:
I am aware that other legislation is pending in the Senate which mandates the collection of
data regarding crimes against racial, ethnic and religious groups. However, these bills do
not require that data be collected on crimes against gay and lesbian individuals. I am
introducing this bill today because I believe that crimes based on prejudice against gay and
lesbian individuals are just as reprehensible as crimes based upon any other types of
prejudice.
134 CoNG. REc. S2000 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
45. The National Gay & Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute has issued annual reports entitled AntiGay/Lesbian Violence, Victimization & Defamation. Annual reports can be ordered from NGLTF at 1734
14th Street, NW, Washington D.C. 20009-4309, (202) 332-6483. The NGLTF also provides other
information concerning proposed and enacted legislation.
46. The most prominent local organizations include Community United Against Violence (CUAV) of
San Francisco at 973 Market Street, San Francisco, California, (415) 777-5500, and New York City Gay
and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, with offices at 208 W. 13th, New York, New York, 10011, (212) 8076761. There are also many more anti-violence projects in cities and municipalities with sizeable lesbian
and gay populations. One researcher has written a book based in part on his empirical studies of antilesbian/gay violence. See COMsTocK, supra note 4.
47. This does not mean, however, that actual incidents of violence have been increasing or decreasing.
As Kevin Berrill of the NGLTF Anti-Violence Project notes, it is difficult to determine whether there are
increased incidences or increased documentation. Kevin T. Berrill, Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization
in the United States.: An Overview, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 274, 287 (1990). What is
uncontroverted, however, is that the violence is widespread. Limiting its documentation to six cities
(Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Minneapolis/St. Paul, New York, and San Francisco), the 1990 NGLTF
report documented 1,588 incidents of anti-gay/lesbian violence in that year. NGLTF Polcy INST ,tur,
ANTi-GAY/LEsIAN VIOLENcE, VITIMIZATION & DEFAMATioN IN 1990 5 (1991) [hereinafter ANTiGAY/LEsBiAN VIoLENcE 1990]. Previous reports collected nationwide figures of 7,031 and 7,248, for
1989 and 1988 respectively. NGLTF Poucy INnsrrr, ANTI-GAY VIOLENCF, VICTIMIZATiON &
D-FAMAntoN iN 1989 1 (1990) [hereinafter ANTI-GAY VIoLENCE 1989] (comparing the 1989 and 1988
statistics on the number of hate crimes perpetrated against gays and lesbians).
48. In addition to news stories about specific instances of aggression, anti-lesbian/gay violence as an
epidemic has been the subject of numerous featured reports. One of the most powerful is a cover story
in The Advocate briefly narrating 127 instances of anti-lesbian/gay violence across the United States that
took place in one month. See John Gallagher, August-A Month of Hate: An Epidemic of Violence,
ADvocATE, Nov. 5, 1991, at 42.
49. The release of the NGLTF's Anti-Gay Violence, Victimization & Defamation in 1988 report
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process.50
Despite the recognition of violence against lesbians and gay
men, the Hate Crime Statistics Act's inclusion of sexual orientation
occurred amidst much controversy within Congress. 51 The compromise
necessary in Congress to preserve the sexual orientation category included
a statement in the Act that since "the American family life is the foundation
of American Society, ... [flederal policy should encourage the well-being,
financial security, and health of the American family, [and] schools should

not de-emphasize the critical value of American family life." 52

Any

doubts about the antidotal function of this paean to the American family are

resolved by the statute's next section: "Nothing in this Act shall be
construed, nor shall any funds appropriated to carry out the purpose of the
Act be used, to promote or encourage homosexuality." 53 The Act also
includes an antidote to any possible judicial interpretation that a law
requiring the collection of statistics about the violence against lesbians and
gay men .might mean that discrimination against them is disfavored:

provoked articles in influential newspapers in New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Houston with
headlines indicating an increase in violence. See Philip S. Gutis, Attacks on U.S. Homosexuals Held
Alarmlng.y Widespread, N.Y.TMEs, June 8, 1989, at A24; Gerald S. Cohen, Attacks Rise Against Gays,
S.F. Ranked Ist, S.F. CHRoN., June 8, 1989, at A2; Lee May, Record Level pf Violence Against Gays
Reported, L.A. TIEs,June 8, 1989, Part 1, at 22; Rob Rebg, Survey Cites Increasein Anti-qky VWolence,
Hous. CHRON., June 8, 1989, at A6.
50. For example, appearing in the CongressionalRecord is the text of a lengthy article that appeared
on page three in the Los Angeles Tunes on April 10, 1986, entitled Gay Bashings-AIDS FearCited as
Attacks on Male Homosuals Grow [hereinafter Gay Bashings]. The article quoted Kevin Berrill, director
of the NGLTF Anti-Violence Project, as saying that "[a]nti-gay violence has reached epidemic proportions"
and narrating instances of anti-gay violence, including information from San Francisco's CUAV as well
as from the Philadelphia and New York anti-violence projects. 134 CONe. REc. S2000 (daily ed. Jan. 25,
1985).
51. See Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. BerrilU, Introduction to HATE CRIMEs: CoNoN71NO
VIOLENCE AoAINsr LEstANs AND GAY MEN 1, 4-7 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992);
Joseph M. Fernandez, Recent Development, Bringing Hate Crimes Into Focus-The Hate CrimeStatistics
Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-275, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 261 (1991) (tracing the bill through
Congress).
52. Hate Crime Statistics Act, supra note 42, § 2(a)(l)-(3). According to the NGLTF, this
amendment was added as a means of preempting an amendment by Senator Jesse Helms. ANTI-GAY
VIOLENCE 1989, supra note 47, at 21 (discussing the dilatory tactics of Sen. Helms and the defeat of his
proposed amendment by a vote of 77-19 in the Senate). The Helms amendment provided that the Senate
declare that:
(I) the homosexual movement threatens the strength and survival of the American family as
the basic unit of society;
(2) State sodomy laws should be enforced because they are in the best interest of public
health;
(3) the Federal government should not provide discriminadon protections on the basis of
sexual orientation; and
(4) school curriculums should not condone homosexuality as an acceptable lifestyle in
American society.
136 CONO. REc. S1169 (1990) (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1990). For further discussions of the compromise, see
Fernandez, supra note 51, at 277-81.
53. Hate Crime Statistics Act, supra note 42, § 2(b).
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a right to bring an action, including

54
an action based on discrimination due to sexual orientation."
The very Act which seeks to collect statistics about the violence
against us is itself a manifestation of that violence. Many legal reformers
believe that the repeal of statutes criminalizing lesbian sex and the passage
of statutes protecting lesbians from discrimination are necessary steps in the
quest to end violence against lesbians, 55 but the Act specifically rejects
these goals. The signing of the Hate Crime Statistics Act marked the first
56
time openly gay men and lesbians were invited to the White House.
Yet under the very rule of law they were invited to celebrate, lesbians
cannot be promoted or encouraged or have any remedies against
discrimination. Such ironies do not negate the Act as an advancement, but
they do indicate the violence that inheres even in rules of law that
implicitly disapprove of the violence against us.
The Act also manifests violence against us through several strategies
of categorizing our identities. First, the category "sexual orientation" 57
is
defined in the Act as "consensual homosexuality or heterosexuality."
Perhaps consensual is meant to modify both homosexuality and
heterosexuality, but even assuming such a charitable interpretation, the
very inclusion of heterosexuality is problematic. As in discrimination
discourse, the category operates to obscure power differentials between
heterosexuals and lesbians or gay men. 58 For example, if a heterosexual
man enters a lesbian bar and makes explicit heterosexual advances to the
lesbian customers, and the lesbians shove him into the bathroom and lock
him inside because they find such flagrant heterosexuality inappropriate and
offensive, the lesbians have committed a hate crime, manifesting "evidence
of prejudice" 59 based on the sexual orientation of heterosexuality.
Second, the de-gendering of the category of sexual orientation is a
violence against lesbians. Lesbians and gay men are not co-extensive. The
de-gendering that occurs usually results in the de-emphasis, if not the
obfuscation, of lesbians. 60 Although some documentation supports a
conclusion that gay men are more likely to be victims of violence than are

54. Id. § 1(a)(3).
55. See, e.g., ANrI-GAY/LEsBIAN VIOLENCE 1990, supra note 47, at 23 (recommending that
government act at every level to prohibit "discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment,
housing, and other areas" and that laws prohibiting consensual homosexual activity be abolished).
56. Herek & Berrill, supra note 51, at 7.
57. Hate Crime Statistics Act, supra note 42, § 1(b)(3).
58. See, e.g., ROBSON, supra note 5, at 85 (criticizing the current legal feminist reform position that
collapses sexual orientation and gender, resulting in the subordination of lesbianism to feminism).
59. Hate Crime Statistics Act, supra note 42, § l(b)(1).
60. For example, an article that is included in the CongressionalRecord and appears, therefore, to
have informed the debate about the Hate Crime Statistics Act, deals only with the issue of gay men. See
Gay Bashings, supra note 50, at 3.
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lesbians,61 more recent reports reflect that lesbians may be twice as likely
to be victims of violence than gay men. 62 More important than
comparing incidences of violence between lesbians and gay men, however,
is the effect that the imperceptibility of violence against lesbians has on
lesbians. Lesbians are apparently much more accepting of the violence
against us and thus less likely to report it or even believe it is anything
other than part of daily life.63
Related to the de-gendering of the category of sexual orientation is the
64
omission of the category of gender from the Hate Crime Statistics Act
Such an omission violently and artificially isolates lesbianism. If a man
rapes a lesbian and says "What you need is a good fluck, dyke," the word
"dyke" may be evidence of a hate crime. 65 However, if the man rapes
the same lesbian and neglects to say the word "dyke," or says other words
as well, or there are no other factors indicating his prejudice against
lesbians, it might not be a hate crime. Not only is her lesbianism
irrelevant, but rape itself is not a crime that "manifests
evidence of
66
recognizes.
Act
the
that
category
any
on
based
prejudice"

61. For example, Gary Comstock's empirical studies reveal that a "higher percentage of men than
women reported experiences of vi6dence in all subcategories, especially being punched, hit, kicked, or
beaten, and having objects throwit them." The size Of such disparities, however, is "consistently not
great.I COmSTOCK, supra'note4, at 38-40.
62. See Victoria A. Brownworth, An Unreported Crisis, ADvOCATE, Nov. 5, 1991, at 50, 50
(referring to a March 1991 study by the San Francisco based group Community United Against Violence
(CUAV) that showed that violence against lesbians was occurring at twice the level as violence against gay
men in San Francisco).
63. As early as 1984, activists were explaining that like other women, lesbians are conditioned by
their gender to accept violence so that when we are assaulted it does not even occur to us to question the
basis for the attack. Ber-ill, spra note 47, at 282. More recently, Jill Tregor, program coordinator at
CUAV, explained that of 400 lesbians surveyed in the Bay Area in 1989, only 15% reported the crimes
to anyone:
Some lesbians didn't see the incidents as important enough. And I have to emphasize here
that these incidents ranged from verbal harassments to stabbings. I think as women, lesbians
are conditioned to expect violence against them. Men are accustomed to believing that they
have rights and that they deserve protection-and that's why they report antigay violence to
authorities, while lesbians do not. Antigay violence is perceived as male by the media and
by the community. Yet increasingly women are the victims.
Brownworth, supra note 62, at 51.
64. Apparently, gender was never considered as a category encompassed by the federal Hate Crime
StatisticsAct. See Fernandez, supranote 51, at 269-81 (discussing legislative history and lobbying efforts,
but not mentioning gender).
65. For example, in one reported case containing a detailed description of a protracted rape of a Santa
Cruz, California lesbian, the court's recitation of the facts includes the defendant repeatedly asking the
victim whether she had a boyfriend, the victim telling the defendant that she was a lesbian, and the
defendant then declaring that the victim "was a sick person and that God must have sent him there because
[she] was a sick person." People v. Hicks, 7 Cal. Rptr. 166, 168 (1992). One wonders whether such a
crime was included in California's bate crime statistics.
66. C. THE VioLENcE AGAINSr WOMEN Acr OF 1991, U.S. REP.No. 283, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
3-27 (1991) (including rape and other crimes "motivated by the victim's gender" among civil rights
violations); Andrea I. Kelly & Elisa A. Long, Recent Development, Violence Against Women: Proposed
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Fourth, and perhaps most insidiously, the insistence on categorization
itself violently atomizes us into separate identities. A rape of a lesbian, to
use this example again, is not necessarily separable into discrete identities.
As quoted in a recent article:
As I was being raped, I was called a dyke and a cunt. The rapist used
those terms as if they were interchangeable. And as I talk to other
women who have been raped-straight and gay-I hear similar stories.
Was my attack antilesbian? Or was it antiwman? I think the facts are
simple. I was raped because as a woman I'm considered rapeable and,
as a lesbian I'm considered a threat. How can you separate those two
things?

67

Under the Act, to "count" as a hate crime, the lesbian must stress her
identity as a lesbian over her identity as a woman and hope that the FBI
statisticians agree with her. A similar situation occurs if the lesbian has
other identities implicated in the crime but not included in the Act, such as
those based on age, race, or disability. To be counted, the lesbian must
discount these identities just as the relevant statute discounts them.
However, even when the lesbian has other identities implicated in the
crime and such identities are included in the act, choices of categories
occur. Thus, in state statutes that include gender, the gender/sexuality
dichotomy is not dissolved, but has different consequences. These
consequences are the same for all identities that are categories under a
statistics act. 68 For example, if the rapist also makes racial slurs, such
"evidence of prejudice" should mandate the statistic as a hate crime based
on race. Does the FBI statistician choose race or sexual orientation? Does
the statistician ask the African-American lesbian if she thinks she was raped
because she is African-American or because she is a lesbian? Does the
statistician ask the rapist about his motivation? Any choice does violence
to our experiences of the violence against us.
Paradoxically, however, the absence of categorization in a hate crime
statistics act may be a fifth kind of violence. Just as the lack of sexual
orientation in a state statute is a violent denial of the violence against us
and the lack of gender in the federal Act is a violent denial of our
experiences of the violence against us, the lack of any categories also
constitutes violence. Many opponents of hate crime bills seek to delete
references to specific groups, usually lesbians and gay men, or failing that,
to seek to delete mention of any group identity. 69 A hate crime statistics
Legislation, 1 "1x.J. WOMEN & L. 285-86 (1992) (providing an overview of the proposed Violence
Against Women Act).
67. Brownworth, supra note 62, at 52.

68. For a discussion of various reporting systems, see Fernandez, supra note 51, at 281-91.
69. For a discussion of the "stripping" of hate crime bills, see NGLTF PoLIcY INSTITUTE,
COUNTIERIN ANTI-GAY VIOLENCE THROUGH LEOISLAIAON 10 (1992) (referring to such incidents in
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act that mandates the collection of statistics of any crime based on bias,
bigotry, or hate may appear to be magnanimously broad, but it actually
erases the realities of violence.70 It also gives government officials wide
latitude to determine the contours of bias, bigotry, and hate-allowing for
the possibility that violence against lesbians is not biased, bigoted, or
hateful, but merely natural.
Violence is not only exhibited in its recognition of categories of bias,
but also in its very categorization of violence. Lesbians need to challenge
the limiting of violence against us to legal crimes. 71 From its inception,
the lesbian and gay anti-violence movement, like the women against
violence movement, has recognized that a violent act may not necessarily
fit the elements of a criminal rule of law. The annual NGLTF AntiViolence reports are thus broadly entitled Anti-Gay/Lesbian Violence,
Victimization & Defamation and include incidents of violence that may not
be criminal, such as "harassment." 72
Given this gap between violence and crime, proposals for the creation
of new crimes seek to expand the rule of law's recognition and punishment
of the violence against us. 73 Such proposals, including the influential
Minnesota, Oregon, Illinois, Michigan, Georgia, Washington, New Jersey, Texas, Pennsylvania, and New
York). Fdr a survey of state statutes that include sexual orientation, as well as of those that do not, see
supra note 41.
70. See, e.g., CoNN. GN. STAT. § 29-7m (1991) (providing in ful that "[o]n and after July 1, 1988,
the division of state police within the department of public safety shall monitor, record and classify all
crimes committed in the state which are motivated by bigotry and bias').
71. This does not mean that I necessarily endorse the category of "crime" or the use of the criminal
justice system. As I have argued elsewhere, the use of the rule of law, including and especially the
criminal rules of law, is problematic at best for lesbians, given our continuing history of being
criminalized. See geeraly ROBSON, supra note 5. Further, given the violence inherent in the law, as
discussed infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text, the use of the law is tantamount to the use of
violence. For a feminist/Marxist perspective on using criminal sanctions to implement feminist reforms,
see Laureen Snider, The Potentialof the CriminalJustice System to PromoteFeminist Concerns, 10 STUD.
L. Po. & Soc'y 143 (1990).
72. For example, under the subtitle "Harrassment/Intimidation" the 1990 NGLTF report included this
anti-lesbian attack:
Salt Lake City, UT: On November 6, a woman walking with her son was pelted with food
by four men in a passing car. One of the men yelled, "I bet you're proud of your dyke
mom, little boy!" When the car returned a short while later, one of the men got out,
unzipped his pants, made obscene gestures, and said to the woman, "What you need is a real
man.'
Amn-GAY/L&saN Viot.EcE 1990, supra note 47, at 17. The report also includes a section entitled
"Defamation," listing some of the "expressions of anti-gay bigotry by public figures [that] were shamefully
commonplace in 1990,'* and noting that "although the offensive remarks quoted are legally protected
speech, they nevertheless foster an atmosphere of intolerance and rejection that facilitates violence." Id.
at 18.
73. Oregon's statute, recognized as the first minority intimidation law, was originally passed in 1981.
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.155 (West Supp. 1990). The law includes sexual orientation as a protected
category. For a critique of the law on the grounds of constitutionality and enforceability, see Helen MazurHart, Comment, RacialandReligious Intimidation:An Analysis of Oregon's 1981 Law, 18 Wat.AMErr
L. REV. 197 (1982). That such laws are relatively new does not mean they are totally without precedent.
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Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith's model legislation, often include

a section creating or increasing civil liability for such acts, so that the
victim could sue the perpetrator for monetary damages. 74 Another
strategy to expand recognition and punishment of the violence against
lesbians has occurred in university policies. Because all of these efforts,
whether they create crimes, civil causes of action, or university policies,
often involve speech acts, they implicate First Amendment concerns. A
University of Michigan policy that subjected students to discipline for acts
of bias was successfully challenged in a federal trial court on First
75
Amendment grounds.

For example, since the early 1950s, Florida has criminalized the wearing of hoods or masks on public or
private property except on Halloween: FLA. STAT. ch. 876, § 876.13-14 (1991). Given Florida's history
of Ku Klux Klan activities, this statute is obviously directed toward eliminating violence against minority
groups.
74. The Anti-Discrimination League Model Legislation provides in Section 1 for the crime of
institutional vandalism. Section 2 provides for crimes of intimidation:
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the actual or perceived race,
color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another individual or group of
individuals, he violates section
of the Penal Code (insert criminal code provision for
criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harassment, menacing, assault, and/or any other
statutorily proscribed criminal conduct).
B. Intimidation is a
misdemeanor/felony (the degree of criminal liability should
be made contingent upon the severity of the injuy incurred or property lost or damaged).
Section 3 provides for civil actions:
A. Irrespective of any criminal prosecution or the result thereof, any person incurring injury
to his person or damage or loss to his property as a result of conduct in violation of Sections
1 or 2 of this Act shall have a civil action to secure an injunction, damages, or other
appropriate relief in law or in equity against any and all persons who have violated Sections
I or 2 of this Act.
B. In any such action, whether a violation of section I or 2 of this Act has occurred shall
be determined according to the burden of proof used in other civil actions for similar relief.
C. Upon prevailing in such civil action, the plaintiff may recover:.
i. Both special and general damages including damages for emotional distress;
ii. Punitive damages; and/or
iii. Reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
Section 4 provides for statistics collection, including training for police officers in identifying, responding
to, and reporting all bias offenses. ADL MODEL HATE CRIMES LEOIsLATnON § 1-4 (1988).
75. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The University of
Michigan policy provided that students were subject to discipline for:.
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis
of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts,
employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or
personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with any
individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University
sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for educational
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The relationship between hate crimes and the First Amendment is a
volatile one. It has caused rifts within the lesbian legal community in the
same way that the pornography debates cause rifts within the lesbian and
feminist communities. 76 Similarly, scholars and legal commentators are
divided on the issue of whether the prohibition of manifestations of some
phenomena variously known as bias, hate, violence, or intimidation, could
be constitutional. 77

pursuits, employment, or participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities.
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical conduct that
stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex or sexual orientation where such
behavior.
[a. b. and c. as above]
Id. at 856. The district judge characterized the challenge to this policy by a psychology student,
represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, as a conflict between "the ideals of freedom and
equality." Id. at 853. Given its own binary opposition, the court chose "freedom" of speech, upholding
the policy only to the extent that it regulates physical acts.
76. I first heard the observation that the hate crime acts may be the sex wars of the 1990s expressed
by lesbian attorney and scholar Mary Dunlap.
77. See generally J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and FreeSpeech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.
J. 399, 400 (1991) (concluding that state universities may lawfully bar racially abusive speech); Mark
Cammack & Susan Davies, Should Hate Speech Be Prohibitedin Law Schools?, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 145,
146 (1991) (contending that law students should be prohibited "from expressing themselves in the language
of racist, sexist, and anti-ethnic insults"); Anthony D'Amato, Harnful Speech and the Culture of
Indetermnancy, 32 WM. & MARY L REV. 329, 330 (1991) (arguing that "[tihe Constitution should not
... and cannot, allow punishment for speaking words that themselves allegedly 'cause hurt'"); Mary E.
Gale, Reimagining the FirstAmendment: Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 119,
128 (1991) (maintaining that protected expression must be distinguished from discriminatory harassment);
Marl Matsuda, PublicResponse to RacistSpeech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2320,
2321 (1989) (calling for legal sanctions for racist speech); R. George Wright, Racist Speech and the First
Amendment, 9 Miss. C. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1988) (observing that "legal suppression of racist epithets is
generally consistent with the free speech clause"); see also Symposium, Campus Hate Speech and the
Constitution in the Afiernath of Doe v. University of Michigan, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 1309 (1991)
(analyzing several articles expressing different interpretations of the constitutionality of regulating hate
speech on college campuses).
Students also participated in this debate. See generally Chad Baruch, Note, DangerousLiaisons:.
CampusRacial HarassmentPolicies,the FirstAmendment, and the Efficacy of Suppression, 11 WHITnER
L. REv. 697, 697 (1990) (asserting that "racial harassment policies are unconstitutional and ineffective");
David McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, Comment, A Libertarian Critique of University Restrictions of
Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825, 825 (1991) (claiming that "only regulations designed to prevent
violence are both permissible under the Constitution and good policy for universities to pursue"); Deborah
R. Schwartz, Note, A FirstAmendment Justficationfor Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 40 CAsE
W. REs. L. REV. 733, 733 (1990) (suggesting that "while discussions of racial issues further the underlying
philosophies of the First Amendment, racist epithets thwart the philosophical objectives that free expression
was designed to protect"); Sean M. SeLegue, Comment, CampusAnt-SlurRegulations:Speakers, Victims,
and the FirstAmendment, 79 CAt. L. REv. 919, 919 (1991) (proposing that state universities "enforce a
personal civility zone protecting people in public forums from personally directed, harassing speech"); John
T. Shapiro, Note, The Calfor Campus Conduct Policies:CensorshiporConstitutionallyPermissibleLimits
on Speech, 75 MINN. L. REv. 201, 205 (1990) (advocating the use of "existing hostile environment
jurisprudence... [as] a guide for determining when a university's interest in maintaining a non-hostile
environment overcomes the First Amendment presumption against restriction of free expression"); Kim
M. Waterson, Note, The Power of Words: The Power ofAdvocacy Challengingthe Power ofHate Speech,
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The United States Supreme Court, however, has quite recently
resolved the debates about the constitutionality of the speech components
of hate crimes, implicating the various types of hate crimes and perhaps
even the statistics acts. In R.A. V.v. St. Paul, 78 the Court considered a
challenge to the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime ordinance, which
criminalized the placing of symbols, objects, or graffiti known to arouse
"anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender." 79 The petitioner, R.A.V., was a white juvenile
charged under the ordinance for assembling a "crudely made cross" and
then burning it "inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived across
the street. " 80
While progressive organizations divided on the
constitutional issue raised by the charge under the ordinance, 81 the Court
did not. In a unanimous judgment, the Court held the ordinance
unconstitutional 82on First Amendment grounds, reversing the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
In holding the ordinance constitutional, the state court had interpreted
its prohibitions as applying only to "fighting words," 83 a category of
52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 955, 956 (1991) (acknowledging that 'not only is hate speech wrong, but.., it can,
perhaps, be regulated or prohibited by law in a principled fashion").
78. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.CQ 2538 (1992).
79.' Id. (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02
(1990)).
80. Id. at 2541. The facts provided by the Court's opinion are extremely truncated and the concurring
opinions barely refer to the facts at all. As reported by the NationalLaw Journal, however, the cross was
ignited by R.A.V. and several other white males "on the lawn of the only black family in the immediate
neighborhood. The family included five children ranging in age from 6 months to 9 years." Marcia
Coyle, Hate Crimes Scrutinized by Justices:Are Social Goals and the Constitution At Odds?, NAT'L L.
J., Dec. 2, 1991, at 1, 50.
81. Amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf on the Petitioner, R.A.V., by: American Civil Liberties
Union, Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, American Jewish Congress, Association of American Publishers,
Freedom to Read Foundation, Patriot's Defense Foundation, Inc., and the Center for Individual Rights.
Briefs were also filed on behalf of St. Paul's position that the statute was constitutionalby: National
Institute of Municipal Law Officers, International City/County Management Association of Counties,
National Governor's Association, U.S. Conference of Mayors, League of Minnesota Cities, City of
Minneapolis, City of St. Paul, Asian-American Legal Defense Fund and Education Fund, The Asian Law
Caucus, The Asian Pacific American Legal Center, National Asian Pacific American Bar Association, AntiDefamation League of B'nai B'rith, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
Clarendon Foundation, National Black Woman's Health Project, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, People
for the American Way. LA.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.CL 2538 (1992).
82. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2550 rev'g In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 412 (Man.
1991). For a different reading of the Supreme Court's decision, see Melvin Salberg & Abraham Foxman,
Still a Good, Legal Way to PunishHate Crimes, Hous. CHRON., July 3, 1992, at A41 (arguing that "it]he
decision should not be read in such sweeping terms" and that penalty enhancement laws, including the ADL
Model Legislation, are still constitutional).
83. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. at 2542 (stating that the United States Supreme Court is bound
by a state court's interpretation of one of its own, or one of its own subdivisions', legislative enactments
and citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 339 (1986)
(deferring to Puerto Rico courts' interpretations of Puerto Rico law); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
769 n.24 (1982) (stating that the Supreme Court is bound by state courts' interpretations); Terminelto v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (observing that the state court's interpretation of the ordinance in question
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speech long considered not to raise any constitutional problems. 84
Despite the Court's unanimity in judgment that this decision be reversed,

the Justices vigorously disagreed about the correct foundation for their
judgment.85 This disagreement centered on categories-and on the
concept of category itself-

86 in

First Amendment jurisprudence.

7

Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reinterpreted the so-called
categorical approach, which views certain categories of speech as

unprotected under the First Amendment.

For Scalia, precedential

statements that certain categories of expression, such as "fighting words,"

as well as obscenity and defamation, are not protected speech are not
"literally true" and "must be taken in context."8 8 What such precedential

statements really mean, according to Scalia, is that certain "areas of speech
can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their
constitutionallyproscribablecontent (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that

they are categories of speech entirely visible to the Constitution, so that
they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their
distinctively proscribable content." 89 The distinction upon which Scalia

is binding on the United State Supreme Court).
84. This principle is articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942):
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem ....
It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Id. at 571-72 (quoted in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S.CL. at 2551-52 (White, J., concurring), 2651 (Stevens,

J., concurring)).
85. The unanimous decision generated four opinions: The opinion of the Court, written by Justice
Scalia and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas; the concurring opinion of Justice
White, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, as well as by Justice Stevens except as to Part I-A; a
brief concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun; and a concurring opinion written by Justice Stevens, Part
I of which was joined by Justices White and Blackmun.
86.
[A] large proportion of our categories are not categories of things; they are
categories of abstract entities. We categorize events, actions, emotions, spatial
relationships, social relationships, and abstract entities of an enormous range:
governments, illnesses, and entities in both scientific and folk theories, like
electrons and colds.
To change the very concept of a category is to change not only our concept of
the mind, but also our understanding of the world.
LAKOFF, supra note 10 at 6, 9.
87. See generally, T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categoriesof Expression, 40 U.
PmrT. L. REV. 519 (1979); Frederick Schauer, Categoriesandthe KFrstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts,
34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981); Pierre Schlag, An Attack on CategoricalApproaches to Freedom of Speech,
30 UCLA L. REv. 671 (1983).
88. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. CL at 2543 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(discussing obscenity); Beauharais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (discussing defamation); Chapliasky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (discussing fighting words)).
89. Id.
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insisted is captured in his analogy: the government may proscribe libel, but
it may not make the further content-based discrimination of restricting only
libel that is critical of the government.' Therefore, the power to prohibit
speech on the basis of a general content category does not include the
ability to further proscribe speech within that category on the basis of
narrower content categories. 91
Justice White, disputing the logic of Scalia's formulation, noted:
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an entire
category of speech because the content of that speech is evil, but that the
government may not treat a subset of that category differently [by
proscribing it only and not the remainder of the category] without
violating the First Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition
92
worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection.

The significance of White's formal logic is embedded in the existence of
categories of speech; without a category of speech excludable from First
Amendment protection, White's deductive display is irrelevant. Thus,
White explicitly asserted that the "categorical approach is firmly entrenched
in First Amendment jurisprudence" and that precedential categorical
93
exclusions of speech were not contextual, but precise doctrinal truths.
The vitality of the categorical approach was not shared by Justice
Stevens in his concurrence. Stevens' conclusion was that the categorical
approach is ultimately unsound because it "sacrifices subtlety for clarity.
...
[T]he concept of 'categories' fits poorly with the complex reality of
expression. " 94 Stevens also criticized Scalia's approach on similar
grounds, finding it an intolerable absolutism that required a government to
95
proscribe either all speech or no speech within a particular category.
Presumably, Scalia's approach also fits poorly with the complex realities
of expression.
The categorical problems of First Amendment jurisprudence inhere in
categories such as "content," especially as related to "idea" and
"message," that the Justices use to analyze the complex realities raised by
the St. Paul ordinance. First Amendment categorical problems are
displayed in almost every example the Justices analyzed. For instance,
Scalia invoked the federal statute making it a crime to threaten the
President with violence. 96 According to Scalia, this statute is

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 2553 (White, J.,concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. at 2552.
Id. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 2562.
Id.at 2546 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1988)).
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constitutional because the categorical content of the speech is neutral
enough to allow a distinction within the category. Specifically, "the
reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment... have
The
special force when applied to the person of the President." 97
separate concurring opinions of both White and Stevens, however, argued
that it is exactly this categorical reasoning that would render the St. Paul
ordinance constitutional, assuming that one believes that "fighting words"
have "special force" when applied to persons who have historically been
subjected to violence. 98 Perhaps it is this very assumption that divides
the Justices. Justice White recognized the nation's "long and painful
experience with discrimination," 99 although it may be relevant to him as
the author of Bowers v. Hardwickl°° that this ordinance does not include
"sexual orientation" as a category. 0 1 Justice Stevens concluded that it
is "eminently reasonable and realistic" to conclude that "the harms caused
by racial, religious, and gender-based invective are qualitatively different
from those caused by other fighting words."' 2 Scalia, however,
emphasized that such speech is part of a "debate," also ironically reasoning
that the ordinance's failure to include categories of speech addressing
"political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality" render it an
imposition of "special prohibitions" on "disfavored subjects." 10 3
What would render the presidential threat statute unconstitutional for
Scalia would be the criminalization of only those threats to the President
"that mention his policy on inner cities. "1°4 For Scalia, this content
("inner cities") is presumably unrelated to the rationale for the
categorization ("threats"), just as the content of bias is presumably
unrelated to the rationale for the categorization of "fighting words." The
violence of bias and "fighting words" is not sufficiently connective for
Scalia. 105 Yet Scalia also argues that it is the very relatedness of the
content to the rationale for the categorization that is determinative: "What
makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc. produced by a violation of
this ordinance distinct from the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc.

97. Id. at 2546 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 871(a)
based upon the interest in protecting the President from harm)).
98. See id. at 2556, 2565.
99. Id. at 2556.
100. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
101. In Hardwlck, Justice White concluded that "majority sentiments" about the morality of
homosexuality supported the criminalization of homosexual sodomy. Id. at 196. In one of his most
notorious statements, White noted that against the backdrop of what Justice Rehnquist called the "ancient
roots" of proscriptions against sodomy, any claim that such sexuality was a fundamental right to be
afforded protection was "at best, facetious." Id. at 194, 196.
102. R.A.v. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2565.
103. Id. at 2547-48.
104. Id. at 2546.
105. For a discussion of harm, see id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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produced by other fighting words is nothing other than the fact that it106
is
caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive message."
According to Scalia, the distinctive idea is a "message of hostility" based
upon characteristics such as race, religion, or gender. Yet this idea is
neither more distinctive nor less a message of hostility than the criminal
statute prohibiting only threats made against the President of the United
States.107
The incoherence of categories, however distinctive, like message and
idea, infects not only the type of hate crime prohibition at issue in R.A. V.
v. St. Paul, but also those that seek to punish crimes more severely if the
crime is bias-motivated. These penalty enhancement statutes, like the
statistics acts, concern only incidents that are encompassed by previously
codified crimes.108 However, like the ordinance in R.A. V, the penalty
enhancement statutes implicate First Amendment concerns because the
element of bias is often provable through speech, and bias itself is a
category of expression or thought. The danger is that there is increased
punishment for words or thought.
This danger, however, is ever present in all categories of crimes. An
element of a crime is often provable through speech, 1°9 especially the
element of intent which is itself a "thought."" 0 Further, all crimes have
content, ideology, and message. At the very least, the ideological content
of any crime is the actor's disregard for the law. This ideology is diffuse
at best, yet it is no more diffuse than a distinctive ideology like "hostility."
Even "hostility" based upon certain characteristics, such as gender, is
analogous to hostility toward the law. Our
recognition of ideology is itself
ul
constructed by the category "ideology."
106. Id. at 2548.
107. Such a statute embodies not only the "distinctive message of hostility" contained in a threat,
but
also communicates the concept that the President's life is more worthwhile than the lives of the rest of us.
For further discussion of the presidential threat statute, see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706
(1969) (reversing lower court's decision that petitioner "knowingly and willfully" made a "threat to take
the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States" in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
871 (a)).
108. See, e.g., supra note 74.
109. See generally KENT OREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USE OF LANGUAGE (1989)
(discussing crimes that have communication as an element and their various relationships to the First
Amendment).
110. Categories of distinction such as motive, purpose, and intent lack a certain coherence, especially
given arguments that motive is an impermissible consideration in assessing criminal responsibility, while
purpose and intent are not. See James Morsch, "heProblem ofMotive in Hate Crimes: The Argumcnt
Against Presunrionsof Racial Motivation, 82 J. CRM. L. & CRtMtNoLOOY 659 (1991) (attempting to
make rational distinctions, although admitting that courts and commentators often confuse motive with the
distinct concepts of intent, specific intent, purpose, and reason).
111. Given the speech components of many elements of crimes, discussed in GREENAWALT, supra
note 109, attempts to distinguish the speech components of hate crimes from other crimes are common.
For example, one commentator criticizes the ADL Model Statute, supra note 74, because the "distinction
between the use of the actor's words as the sole-and perhaps only possible-element of an offense and
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For lesbians, theorizing violence should not be grounded on First
Amendment categories of speech, or even upon the category of speech
itself. The First Amendment is rooted in European notions of liberalism,
including individualism 112 and private property. 113

Its value to

lesbianism must be decided by us, not assumed by us. Our thinking in this
area is domesticated by the powerful propaganda that enshrines free speech

as one of the most cherished liberties.11 4 Yet "lesbian" is a category

their use as [merely an] element of an offense" is virtually nonexistent:
This is not the case in other contexts in which speech is used as evidence of an element of
an offense. For example, introduction of evidence that a defendant used a note in a bank
robbery or divulged information in an antitrust violation would not infringe First Amendment
rights. In those cases, there is no likelihood of confusing the speech itself with the elements
of the offenses evidenced thereby. There is no risk of chilling protected thought, speech, or
association. The illegal conduct consists of a verbal act, but the actor's beliefs, opinions, and
ideas are not at issue. By contrast, the ADL model statute is directed specifically toward the
harboring and expression of bigoted sentiments; without them, there is no violation of that
statute.
Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence?:
Constitutional andPolicy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REv. 333, 359-60 (1991).
Yet a distinction between a note or statement that says "Give me the money or I'll kill you" and one
that says "Death to dykes" is not necessarily obvious. Neither statement is an expression of an idea, yet
both are expressions of underlying ideological positions. The statement, "Give me the money or I'll kill
you," is not an idea; it is a command. Nevertheless, it expresses underlying ideas: Violence is an
appropriate way to obtain money, people (like the bankteller) should generally capitulateto threats of death,
and it is justifiable to rob a bank. Similarly, the statement, "Death to dykes," is not an idea; it is a
declaration. It does, however, express underlying ideas: Lesbians do not deserve to live; lesbians are less
valuable members of society than nonlesbians. In the penalty enhancement statutes, neither of these
underlying ideas alone is sufficient to invoke criminal sanctions; they must be accompanied by some act
that manifests the ideology and otherwise violates a criminal statute. The difference is that we generally
recognize the ideological content of expressions like "Death to dykes," but not of expressions such as
'Give me the money or I'll kill you."
112. This is best expressed in JOHN STUART MilL, ON LmiERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett
Publ. Co. 1978). After the introductory chapter, Mill's first chapter is entitled "Of the Liberty of Thought
and Discussion," while the next is "Of Individuality, As One of the Elements of Well-Being." There are
many explicit and implicit links between these two themes of freedom of speech and individualism, For
example Mill writes, "[I]f all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified
in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." 1d.
at 16.
113. See William H. Riker, Cvil Rights and Property Rights, in LmITY, PROPETY AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 49, 53-55 (Ellen F. Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990)
(linking the origin of the right of free speech to the right of property); see gewrally JENNtFE NEDEI.SKy,
PRIVATE PROPtTY AND THE LImTrrs OF AMERicAN CONSTITUrIONAUSM (1990) (arguing that our political
framework and understanding of politics are manifested in the Constitution in its focus on private property
and on its goal of protecting unequal property). The property base upon which free speech rests is also
evident in Justice Holmes' famous statement that freedom of speech is justified by the necessity for free
trade in the marketplace of ideas. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). See also Paul Chevigny, Philosophy of Language and Free Expression, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
157, 160 n.27 (1980) ("The marketplace metaphor as a rationale for the protection of speech is not original
with Holmes but long antedates the framing of the First Amendment.").
114. For an exposition of this propaganda during the Constitution's Bicentennial, see Daniel Levin,
The Price of Rights: The Commodification of the Constitution During its Bicentennial, Address Before the
Law and Society Association Annual Meeting (1992).
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that is often excluded from free speech, not only in the unprotected
category of obscenity, u 5 but also when it is used to modify another
component of speech that is a piece of private property, 116 or when it is
unilaterally politicized." 7 Certainly, lesbians and others fighting against
the repression of lesbian speech often rely upon the First Amendment, as
in the recent National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) funding
controversies.11 8 Nevertheless, this strategic reliance should not be

115. See supra note 33.
116. For example, the United States Supreme Court has upheld an injunction against the use of the
word "Olympics" in conjunction with the "Gay Olympics," holding that the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) "owned" the word "Olympic" pursuant to 36 U.S.C. § 380. San Francisco Arts and
Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). Despite the Court's ruling that the
federal statute invested the USOC with more rights of ownership in the word than an ordinary trademark,
the Court found that the USOC was not even a quasi-government agency. Thus, neither the First
Amendment nor any other constitutional provision applied. The USOC's decision to selectively enforce
its ownership of the word "Olympics" was, therefore, insulated from review. The USOC may seek an
injunction against the use of "olympics" when joined with "gay," despite its affirmative grant of permission
to other groups such as the "Special Olympics" or the "Explorer Olympics," and its nonaction to prohibit
other sorts of Olympics such as the "Crab-racing Olympics." Coincidentally, as I am writing, I am
listening to the "Modern Rock Olympics" on a New York radio station, wondering whether groups such
as Nirvana, U-2, or Erasure will win the gold medal, but not wondering whether the USOC will seek an
injunction. For further discussionof the "Gay Olympics" case, see Kelley Browne, Note, A Sad 7ime for
the Gay Olymipics: SFAA v. USOC, 56 U. CN. L. R V. 1487 (1988).
117. Lesbians are quintessentially 'politically correct," a phrase current in lesbian communities of the
early 1980s and now used to disparage all lesbians as 'thought police" who are intolerant of free speech
whenever they speak in protest. See generally Marilyn Frye, Geting It Right, 17 SiNS 781 (1992)
(remembering when the term "politically correct" could be used as a term of sincere aspiration and seeking
to revitalize that aspiration). For an excellent article dissecting the charges of "political correctness" made
notorious by Dinesh D'Souza in his book llberal Education, as applied to the legal academy, see Mark
Tushnet, PoliticalCorrectness,the Law, and the Legal Academy, 4 YALE I.L. & HUmAN. 127 (1992).
118. In the recent NEA controversy, Congress passed a law forbidding als grants to be used to
"promote, disseminate or produce" art that included depictions of "homo-eroticism" or that was deemed
"obscene." Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, tit. III art. 304(a)-(c), 103 Stat. 744. This
provision, known as the Helms Amendment, after its sponsor Senator Jesse Helms, was subsequently
replaced by an amendment that provided that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which
applications are judged taking into consideration general standards of decency" and that "obscenity is
without artistic merit, is not protected speech, and shall not be funded." Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 103(b),
104 Stat. 1915, 1963-66 (codified at 20 USC § 954 (d)(1), (2) (1990)). For discussions of the controversy,
including its First Amendment ramifications, see Donald W. Hawthorne, Subversive Subsidization:How
NEA Art Funding Abridges PrivateSpeech, 40 KAN. L. REv. 437 (1992); Robert M. O'Neill, Artists,
Grants andRights:The AEA ControversyRevisited, 9 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTs. 85 (1991); Senator Jesse
Helms, Art, the FirstAmendment and the NEA Controversy, 14 NOVA L. REv. 317 (1990); Nancy Ravitz,
Note, A Proposal to Curb CongressionalInterference wIth the National Endoenent for the Arts, 9
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L. J. 475 (1991). See also Bella Lewitzky Dance Foundation v. Frohamayer,
754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Ca. 1991) (holding that the NEA's requirement that grant recipients certify
compliance with the policy against obscenity was unconstitutionally vague and chilling of protected speech).
Cf. Fordyce v. Frohnmayer, 763 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1991) (denying standing to a taxpayer protesting
the NEA's partial funding of the "anti-Christian" production Tongues of Flame on grounds that such
funding violated the First Amendment's establishment clause).
Despite compromises and the resignation of John Frohamayer as the NEA's director, the NEA
controversy continues. The new director of the NEA, Anne-Imelda Radice, has stated that the NEA will
continue to examine the sexual content of art projects, and that she will veto funding for any projects with
"difficult subject matter" or "sexually explicit matter." Although a lesbian herself, Radice nevertheless
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determinative of our theories. 119
An act of violence-"burning a cross in someone's front yard"-is
within the category of the reprehensible according to Justice Scalia. 20
Nevertheless, Scalia, joined by a majority of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, concluded that this reprehensible burning cross should be addressed
"without adding the First Amendment to the fire." 121 The First
Amendment, however, may be as incendiary a fuel for lesbian theory as
lesbian bodies once were for the fires of legal executions.
C. The Category of LAW
The law's arbitration of violent interactions between individuals
exhibits the law's own violence. 122 The late legal scholar Robert Cover
phrased the law's inherent violence most graphically, reminding us that we
do not read court opinions because they are aesthetically pleasing or
intellectually stimulating, but because they are backed by soldiers. 123 In
Cover's uncompromising perception, the law occurs "in a field of pain and
death." 124 Our "legal world" is "built only to the extent that there are
commitments that place bodies on the line." 125 The political world of
nation-states also places bodies on the line, although philosophers differ
concerning the primary violence of political organization. 126 The law,
disapproves of homo-erotic art and is supported by Senator Jesse Helms. See Tommi A. Mecca, A Lesbian
Even Bush and Helms Could Love, S.F. BAY TMEs, June 4, 1992, at 4; Maer Roshan, Anne Radiceand
the Politics of Appeasement, QW, June 7, 1992, at 23.
119. C. GAYA'TI C. SPIVAK, Subaltern Studies: DeconstructingHistoriography, in IN OTHM
WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CuLTURAL PoLrrIcs 197 (1988) (discussing essentialist strategies and historiography
in theories of India and colonialism).
120. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992). The use of "someone" here, rather than the
reference "African-American," serves to obliterate history and places the speech in a noncontextual
category.
121. Id.
122. A distinct but related concept to the law's violence is the law's authoritarianism. For an
excellent analysis, see Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianismand the Rule ofLaw, 66 IND. L.J. 379 (1991).
123. As Robert Post recalls:
I vividly remember Robert Cover at a conference remarking on the question of why legal
scholars pondered so carefully the words of then-Chief Justice Burger. It was not, said
Cover, because the Chief Justice was so deep a thinker or so talented a writer, but because
his judgments were enforced by the United States Army. His words were written, so to
speak, in blood.
Robert Post, Tradition, the Self, and Substantive Due Process:A Comment on Michael Sandel, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 553, 559-60 (1989).
124. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
125. Id. at 1605.
126. This is expressed in political theories variously denominated as "consent," "contract," or
"obligation" theory. Such theories address the possibility of a foundation-other than violence or
force-for the state's power. Classical theorists such as Hume, Locke, and Rousseau considered whether
nation-states exercised legitimate authority based upon the consent of those against whom such authority
was exercised. See generally DAVID HUmE, POLITrCAL ESSAYS (Charles W. Hendel ed., 1948); JOHN
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however, is generally considered to be the instrument of the state that

(violently) maintains state power. 127 Relying on Cover, other scholars
conclude that "law is a world of violence, death, pain, and suffering"
which cannot be "understood apart from the violence it deals," 128 or,
more optimistically, define law as "two parts violence and three parts
hope." 129 Distinct from this rapidly developing Coverian tradition,
however, scholars as different as Jacques Derrida, the paragon of
deconstruction, and Richard Posner, the philosopher13 of law and economics,
agree that the law is based on force and coercion. 0
The law manifests its violence in concrete terms: "Ajudge articulates
her understanding of a text, and as a result somebody loses his freedom,
his property, his children." 131 Lesbians experience these concrete
manifestations of violence daily-we are more likely to be imprisoned than
heterosexual women, 132 we lose property in courts that do not recognize
our relationships, 133 and we have our children taken away. 13

It is not

only that the law fails to objectively justify such concrete manifestations of
violence, 135 it is that the law actively supports such concrete violences

LOCKF, Two TREATISEs OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1965); JEAN-JACQUES RoUSSEAU, TilE
SOCIAL CONiR.ACT AND DISCOURcES (G.D.H. Cole ed., 1950). Such ideas formed the theoretical
underpinnings of American constitutionalism.
Recent feminist reconceptualizations of such theories stress their gendered nature. See, e.g., NANCY
J. HIRSCHMANN, RE"hINKINO OBiGATION: A FEMINIST MEMOD FOR POLmCAL THEORY (1992);
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMoCRACY, FEMINISM AND POlrTICALTHEORY (1989).
127. Rules of law "are supposed to rule." Margaret Radin, Reconsidering the Rule ofLaw, 69 B.U.
L. R V. 781, 809 (1989).
128. Tristan L. Duncan, NarrativeJurisprudence: he Renmystification of the Law, 7 J.L. & REUGiON
105 (1989).
129. Steven Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for
Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1223 (1989).
130. Jacques Derrida stated that "there is no such thing as law (droit)that doesn't imply in Itself, a
priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being 'enforced,' applied by force,"
Derrida, supra note 14, at 925, while Posner observed, "Law is coercion rather than persuasion,"
RicHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LrsATuRE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 249 (1988).
131. Cover, supranote 124, at 1601. Cover's use of gendered pronouns in this instance obscures the
political and legal reality that male judges' understanding of texts operates to deprive lesbians and other
women of freedom, property, and children.
132. See Robert Leger, LesbianismAmong Women Prisoners:Participantsand Nonparticipants,14
CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAv. 448, 463 (1987) (concluding in a sociological study that compared with
heterosexual women, lesbians "had.longer sentences, were arrested at an earlier age, were more likely to
have been previously confined and had served more time").
133. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sherman, Undue Influence andthe Homosexual Testator,42 U. PiTt. L. REv.
225 (1981) (concluding that some evidence suggests that courts are more willing to nullify wills in which
a testator bequeaths his estate to a homosexual lover than wills made by a heterosexual testator, leaving
an estate to a heterosexual lover).
134. See infra notes 146-156 and accompanying text.
135.
The law tries to justify its violence with words, and yet becauke words cannot
adequately capture the pain of the law's violence, law is bound to fail at verbal
justification. The more the law is pushed in the direction of objectification, the
more removed it becomes from the reality of pain.
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through the symbolic violence of its discourse. As feminist legal theorist
Rosemary Coombe notes: "Legal interpretation is not something joined
with the practice of violent domination, but an example of that practice; in
other words, the process of legal interpretation can itself be seen as a
simply a practice which has political
practice of political violence, not 136
consequence."
likely
a
as
violence
Such violence is not only exemplified by the violent expressions
contained in the Hate Crime Statistics Act, but in the law's insistence that
it control all categories, not only the category "lesbian," but all categories
of relation among lesbians. For example, the law has uniformly denied
lesbians-and gay men-the right to marry based upon its interpretation of
the legal category of marriage.' 3 7 That the category of marriage may
itself be an expression of legal violence 138 does not cancel out the
violence of its denial to lesbians. 139 Further, the remaining categories

of relation available to lesbians are also violent. Contract, for example,
has been posited as an acceptable legal category and many lesbian advisors
counsel lesbians to adopt relationship contracts, yet contracts are also
rooted in patriarchal violence. 140 As Derrida succinctly states, "there is
no contract that does not have violence as both an origin and an
outcome." 141 Even relatively benign legal categories without a history
of violence, such as "attorney in fact" or "beneficiary," do violence to

Duncan, supra note 128, at 107.
•
136. Rosemary Coombe, "SameAs ItEver Was". Retinking the Politics of Legal Interpretation,34
McGu. L.J. 603, 649 (1989). Coombe relies upon the work of Pierre Bourdieu, whose theoretical
framework enables one to "analy[sle the ways in which symbolic practices exercise their own type of
violence, a [']gentle[,] invisible form of violence['] which is never recognized as such, or which is
recognized only by concealing the mechanisms upon which it depends." Id. at 650 (quoting John B.
Thomson, Symbolic Violence: LanguageandPower in the Writings of PierreBourdieu, in STUDIES INTHE
THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 43 (1984)).
137. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (denying a marriage license to two
women because what they proposed was not a legal marriage); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. CL
App. 1974) (explaining that appellants were not denied a marriage license because of their sex, but because
of the nature of the marriage itself).
138. For an argument that marriage is a category of violence against women "interwoven with both
the development and the perpetuation of patriarchy and women's status within patriarchy," see Ruthann
Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers:Lesbiansas Intimate PartnersandLesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMPLE
L. REv. 511, 536-38 (1990).
139. Further, some argue that by entering the institution of marriage, lesbians and gay men can
transform the institution for the better. See, e.g., Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage
Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Mneties, 1 LAw & SExuALIrY: REV. LESBIAN
& GAY LEcAL ISSUES 63, 87 (1991) (hypothesizing that liberalizing the boundaries of legal marriage would
lead to legal recognition of nontraditional family arrangements); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and
Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, I LAw & SmUALrry: REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, 9 (1991)
(arguing that same-sex marriages would recast social constructs of male and female difference theory).
140. For sources advising lesbians to enter into relationship contracts, see Robson & Valentine, supra
note 138, at 521 n.65. For an argument that contract ideology can be destructive of lesbian relationships,
see Id. at 521-28.
141. Derrida, supra note 14, at 1015.
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lesbians because they compress lesbian relationships into legal categories
rather than lesbian ones.
The law's control of categories produces an insidious violence I call
the domestication of lesbian existence. Domestication is similar to other
political processes that have been named colonization and imperialism. Yet
both imperialism and colonization describe concrete historical processes
that have resulted in slavery, death, and destruction, and I have come to
prefer the term domestication to connote the law's hegemony over lesbian
survival. Domestication is connotatively gendered. It implies the
relegation of women to the domestic sphere, a private place that can
facilitate domination and inhibit collective action. It also implies the
circumscribing of one's potential to the service of another, as when animals
are domesticated for human use.
Domestication also describes a process of substituting one way of
thinking for another. Domestication has occurred when the views of the
dominant culture, in this case the legal culture, are so internalized that they
are considered to be common sense. The barbed wire enclosures seem to
exist for our protection rather than our restriction. We attempt to argue
ourselves into legal categories so that we can
be protected, not noticing
142
how such categories restrict our lesbianism.
Domestication operates powerfully not only against the lesbians who
are directly at risk of losing their freedom, property, or children because
they have become actors on law's field of "pain and death," 143 but also
when legal categories limit nonlegal choices. 144 However, the most
powerful violence of domestication inheres in its mundane frequency.
There are many days that even lesbians working within law's "field
of pain and death" can forget about the law's violence, or believe it is
abstract, or believe it does not apply to the particularized lesbian each of
us is, or believe it is being relegated to history. I am busy making
preparations to board a plane from New York, where I teach at a

142. Yet domestication also has within it the idea of its opposite. To have been domesticated, one
must have once existed wild, and there is the possibility of a feral future. To be feral is to have survived
domestication and to have been transformed into an untamed state. Post-domestication lesbian existence
is one goal of a lesbian legal theory: if we can confront the ways in which we are domesticated, we can
begin to challenge our domestication. Despite the domestication metaphor, I am not conceptualizing
lesbians as women who have been trapped in little houses on the prairie by mean men or as wild animals
who have been harnessed to plow the soybean fields. While these are tempting images that foster an
idealized version of our innocence and victimization, such images conflict with my experience. To use the
postmodern phrase, we are "always already" domesticated. We are born and socialized with reference to
the dominant culture. However, I do not believe that we are necessarily so constricted. See generally,
ROBSON, supra note 5.
143. Cover, supranote 124, at 1601.
144. The most compelling example of this that I have witnessed is a lesbian's articulation of the choice
to have her child call her "mother" because of the law's imposition of legal responsibility upon her as a
.mother." For a discussion of this incident, see ROBSON, supra note 5, at 140.
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progressive law school as a lesbian whose scholarship is devoted to lesbian
subjects. I am going to a conference at the University of Texas to speak
on lesbians and violence.

I am making the final edits to an piece on

lesbian legal theory. Two of my research assistants, both lesbian law
students, give me some legal research on lesbian issues from their weekly

computerized search. One case in particular, one of them says to me, is
worth reading. "What does it say?" I ask. She laughs, but her eyes glint
somewhere between hard and hurt. "You'll have to read it yourself," she

out of my office without saying goodbye. The other one
says and walks
5
follows.

14

The case is Cldcoine v. Chicoine.146 The court is the supreme court

of South Dakota. The year is 1992. The case is domestic, an appeal of

an award of restricted visitation rights to a lesbian mother. There is a
dissenting and concurring opinion which quotes Leviticus147 and the
Egyptian Book of the Dead: an opinion reeking with violence.' 48 There
is a majority opinion which stuns the reader with its violent reversal of the
trial court: the overnight unsupervised visitation of the children with the
mother is so liberal that it is held to be an abuse of discretion, despite the
female or homosexual male could be present
condition that "no unrelated1 49
during the children's visit."
The South Dakota Supreme Court enumerates the basis of its opinion
that unsupervised overnight restricted visitation every other weekend was
too liberal for Lisa Chicoine and her two children, James, age six, and
Tyler, age five, with

revelations from the record. 15°

These chosen

145. Without the specific work of my research assistants, my own research would never be current.
More importantly, however, my work benefits from their insights, determination, and imagination.
146. Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992).
147. For an enlightening discussion of the legacy of Leviicus, including parallels between the biblical
passages and empirical data on contemporary anti-lesbian/gay violence, see COMSTOCK, supra note 4, at
120-37.
148. Justice Henderson of the South Dakota Supreme Court wrote:
Lesbian mother has harmed these children forever. To give her rights of reasonable
visitation so that she can teach them to be homosexuals, would be the zenith of poor
judgment for the judiciary of this state. Until such time that she can establish, after years
of therapy and demonstrated conduct, that she is no longer a lesbian living a life of
abomination (see Leviticus 18:22), she should be totally estopped from contaminating these
children. After years of treatment, she could then petition for rights of visitation. My point
is: she is not fit for visitation at this time.... There appears to be a transitory phenomenon
on the American scene that homosexuality is okay. Not so. The Bible decries it. Even the
pagan "Egyptian Book of the Dead" bespoke against it. Kings could not become heavenly
beings if they had lain with men. In other words, even the pagans, centuries ago, before the
birth of Jesus Christ, looked upon it as total defilement. This case is in a divorce setting.
terminated,
If it were under thejuvenile code of this state, rights to a child could be totally
through a petition, by reason of "environment.., injurious to the child's welfare" imposed
by parents upon a child. [citation omitted].
Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d at 896-97 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. Id. at 893.
150.
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revelations reveal more about the court's violence toward lesbianism than
about Lisa Chicoine's mothering. For example, the first listed revelation
finds fault with the mother for being a victim of child sexual abuse-a
violence from which the law apparently did not protect her. The court
describes the violence of her own sexual abuse as her "psychological
problem." Another psychological problem is her "active homosexual
relationships with several female partners." The violence of the clinical
word "homosexual" is inflamed with other sexual transgressions such as
"active" and "several" partners. Thus, Lisa Chicoine is exiled even from
the "good homosexual" category that some courts have employed to shield
15 1
monogamous and discreet "homosexuals" from the law's violence.

The record in this case reveals:
(1) Lisa has experienced a myriad of psychological problems including an eating disorder,
depression, suicidal threats, sexual abuse as a child and active homosexual relationships with
several female partners.
(2) In the last two years of marriage, Lisa was absent from the home frequently.
(3) Lisa openly admits that she is an active homosexual and that she had many sexual
encounters with female partners during her marriage.
(4) Lisa and the children moved out of the marital home and into Lisa's lover's home.
(5) Lisa and her lover were affectionate toward each other in front of the children,
caressing, kissing and saying "I love you."
(6) The older son reacted by saying "Mommy don't touch," or "Don't!" when Lisa and her
lover held hands.
(7) Lisa and her lover were in an intimate position in bed when the oldest son entered the
room. Lisa told her son to go back to bed and when questioned by her son why she was
lying on top of the other woman, Lisa told him she was telling secrets. Lisa did not stop the
sexual act to comfort her son.
(8) On at least two occasions, Lisa took the children to gay bars in Sioux City when she was
out looking for her lover.
(9) On some occasions when the children were not present, Lisa publicly danced with
females, kissing and caressing them on the dance floor.
(10) On some occasions, James and Tyler were allowed to get in bed to sleep with Lisa and
her lover. Sometimes Lisa would be unclothed.
(11) Lisa and her lover discussed getting married and raising the children in a homosexual
marriage.
(12) Lisa admits that it is inappropriate to hold hands, kiss, and show affection to her lesbian
partners in front of her children.
(13) Lisa has openly exposed her homosexual feelings in front of her sons on more than one
occasion.
(14) Dr. Arbis testified that "unless Lisa blatantly and consciously encourages them [the
children] to engage in sexual behavior, or blatantly =dWbtts her sexual behavior In front of
them, they will not receive any adverse developmental messages in terms of their own sexual
preferences."
Id. at 893-94.
151. For example, in M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), a trial court
modified a custody decree in favor of a "homosexual" father, repeatedly using judgments like "discreet,"
anot flamboyant," and "decorous, not blatant." Id. at 963. The court also noted the father's relationship
with a [sole] partner as "stable and of eight years duration." Id. at 966.
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Other enumerated revelations from the court also make clear Lisa
Chicoine's exile from the "good homosexual" category; Not only has she
demonstrated affection to her lover in front of the children, but the record
also states that "Lisa and her lover were affectionate toward each other in
front of the children, caressing, and kissing and saying 'I love you.'" 152
The court also finds noteworthy Lisa's audacity in comparing
homosexuality to heterosexuality: "Lisa and her lover discussed getting
married and raising the children in a homosexual marriage;" as well as her
"admission" of her misconduct: "Lisa admits that it is inappropriate to hold
hands, kiss, and show affection to her lesbian partners in front of her
children." The court's revelations from the record comprise a mirror of
wrongdoing. A lesbian mother cannot avail herself of attempts at
respectability without being ludicrous and even her attempts to conform her
conscience, to the dictates of the law are rendered evidence against her.
The standard by which the court measured Lisa Chicoine's capacity
to visit her children is the best interests of the children. 153 This
seemingly innocuous standard has within it a violence toward lesbianism,
and toward any sexuality other than heterosexuality. 'The danger of Lisa
Chicoine is that she might communicate any "adverse developmental
messages in terms of [the children's] own sexual[ity]." 154 Adverse
developmental messages are any messages that interfere with
heterosexuality. Almost all custody cases involving lesbian or gay parents
rest on the foundation that it is not in the best interests of any child to
mature into anything other than a heterosexual. 155
152. Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d at 893-94. C. M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 966
(noting approvingly that "[the father's lover] and the father never embrace or touch in front of the
children").
153. Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d at 894.
154. Id.
155. This assumption has marked the litigation and supporting social science evidence submitted on
behalf of lesbian (and gay) parents. As noted by Nancy Polikoff in her discussion about the education ofjudges:
Lawyers representing lesbian and gay parents often call witnesses to educate judges; these
witnesses are primarily mental health professionals who testify that homosexuality is not a
mental illness, that the children will not be harmed by living with a lesbian or gay parent,
that the children will not become lesbian or gay as a result of living with a lesbian or gay
parent, that lesbian and gay people do not have a propensity to molest children, and so on.
Nancy D. Polikoff, Edcadng Judges About Lesbian and Gay Parenting:A Simulation, I LAw &
SExuAuiwy: REv. LESBLAN & GAY LEaAL IssuEs 173, 175 (1991) (emphasis added). Polikoff also cites
to an amicus curiae brief filed by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. on behalf of a gay man
seeking to adopt a two-year-old girl. The brief included a review of the psychological literature supporting
the conclusion that "the father's sexual orientation would not affect the child's sexual orientation." Id. at
175 n.4. The psychological expert witness on behalf of the lesbian mother testified that when asked
whether she had a preference about the children's sexual orientation, the mother replied that "her choice
was that both be heterosexual since it would be easier on them in their lives." Id. at 217. The future
sexual orientation of the children as a component of their best interests may not always be explicitly stated.
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Lisa Chicoine's case results in her being denied the company of her
children. It is a daily violence that many lesbian mothers have endured.
The violent message of Lisa Chicoine's case is that lesbians are not
sanctioned as mothers. The violence of this message is shielded from the
lesbian law students; they live, after all, in New York, not South Dakota.
Yet they have also read the same message in the more liberal cases in the
more liberal states: lesbians can only be mothers if they are very, very
156
good girls.

The violence of legal discourse about lesbian mothers, however, is not
limited to lesbian motherhood. The violence of cases such as Chicoine is
that lesbians, whether we are mothers or not, must be eradicated. What
lesbian law students understand when they read cases like Chicoine, and
even liberal legal discourse, is that it is not in the best interest of anyone
to be a lesbian. What lesbians know is that we are the children who did
not mature into what the law mandated for us.
III. On Arson
We are not to be encouraged. We are not to be allowed to mature
into ourselves. Our legal history is a history of fire. We have been
burned at the stake in countless countries, in uncounted incidents, with the
sanction of the law.' 57 Given the law's violence toward lesbians, it is
tempting to relegate lesbians to the status of victims. This victim status
might entitle us to glorification, 158 but I am interested in our survival. 159
Standards such as whether the parent's sexuality "adversely affects" or "harms" a child often implicitly
includes presumptions of adversity and harm from any sexuality other than heterosexuality.
156. This is the rule of the exemplary lesbian. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va.
1981) (reversing lower court's approval of adoption by child's stepmother on ground that the natural
mother's lesbian relationship alone does not outweigh clear and convincing evidence that she is a fit parent
"in every other respect"). C. White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (Miss. 1991) (affirming
removal of children from their mother's custody to that of their paternal grandparents on the ground that
she was an unfit parent "morally or otherwise" due to her financial situation, past adulterous behavior,
marijuana use, and her lesbian relationship). For further discussion, see Robson & Valentine, supra note
138.
157. Perhaps the most well documented case is that of Margaretha Linck, whose method of execution
is unclear, the opinion devotes considerable energy to deciding whether burning or other methods are most
appropriate, but is inconclusive. See A Lesbian Execulion in Gerny, 1721: The Trial Records, 6 J.
HoMoSmALTy 27 (Brigette Eriksson trans., 1980). For a discussion of other lesbian executions by
burning, including a discussion of the relationships between lesbianism and the European witch burnings,
see Robson, supra note 22; RoBsON, supra note 5, at 39-40.
158. Not only does the sanctification of the victim mark much religious ideology, but the victim also
has a privileged place in the legal system. See generally ANDREW J. McKENNA, ViOLENCE AND
DiFEEwcE: GwAD, DERIDA, AND DECONSTRUCnON 76, 78 (1991) (discussing the symbolism victims
hold for the general public, especially in the context of sacred rituals). In postmodernist theory, the victim
also has a privileged position, especially in the work of Rene Girard. As expressed by MeKenna, writing
about Girard's work in conjunction with the work of Derrida:
The victim is the matrix of difference and the origin of differance, the play of differences:

1993]

Incendiary Categories

Violence mediates the relationship between lesbians and law not only
because the law is inherently violent and expresses some of that violence
toward lesbianism, but also because lesbianism is inherently violent and
expresses some of that violence toward the legal regime. Lesbianism exists
as a violent rupture in the law's enforcement of heterosexual hegemony.
Lesbianism expresses its violence whenever it exists, even when this
existence is not in direct resistance to the law's violence.
Interrogating whether lesbian violence or legal violence is originary
is akin to asking the chicken and egg question: neither is very productive.
Rather than being interested in whether legal violence mandated the violent
resistance of lesbianism or whether lesbian violence produced the violent
repression of the law, 160 I am more interested in the survival and
perpetuation of lesbianism. It is the violence of lesbianism that is
responsible for its survival.
Throughout this Article, the categories of law, violence, and lesbian
have been interrogated and related, but essentially undefined. Law as a
category should probably best be left undefined in a law review article.
"Lesbian" as a category is barely definable against various political
backdrops:161 a postmodernist influenced "queer theory" that regards all
categories as suspect, 162 suggestions that to define lesbian is to succumb
between signifier and signified, sacred and profane, violence and peace, and chaos and
community, whose presence to itself as cum-unus is mediated by the designation of the victim
and the deferrals of violence that stem from that originary differance.
Id. at 135. See generally, RENE GIRARD, THE SCAPEOOAT 12-23 (Yvonne Freccero trans., 1986) (1982);
RENE GIRARD, VIoLtENcE AND THE SAcRED 302 (Patrick Gregory trans., 1979).
159. By survival I mean two things. First, I mean the survival of individual lesbians on a daily
basis-a survival that depends upon access to the necessities of life such as food, shelter, work, safety, and
love. Second, I mean our survival as lesbians-a survival that depends upon our freedom not to barter our
sexualities, philosophies, cultures, identities, and histories in order to have access to the first type of
survival.
160. I thus agree with Judith Roof, who writes about originary pursuits in the context of lesbian
sexuality, that:
Concepts of origins appearing to embody the desirable attributes of a reformed culture are
lures that distinguish an originary cause, then confuse that cause with its effects. In this
focus on cause/effect, a consciousness of desire as a driving force tends to be subordinated
to the seductive mirage of the impossible but ideal object .... Origins are alluring because
their imagined pattern of joinder and multiplicity opposes the alienating singularity that
enables the operation of binary oppositions-because they promise both fullness and the
power to change all representations beyond the origin itself.
JUDITH RooF, A LuRE oF KNowED: LESBIAN SEXUALITY AND THEORY 127-28 (1991).
161. It is important to remember that any definition of lesbian, like the definition of any term or
category, is a political act and not simply a "factual dispute." In concrete terms, for lesbians the debate
may have "political implications about the best way to conceive lesbianism in order to advance the cause
of lesbian/gay liberation and feminism." Ann Ferguson, Is There a Lesbian Culture?, in LESBIAN
PfuwOsopmES AND CULTuRES 63, 69 (Jeffner Allen ed., 1990).
162. See, eg., Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSID/OUT: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAY THEoRIEs 13, 14 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) ("To install myself within the terms of an
identity category [like lesbian] would be to turn against the sexuality that the category purports to
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164
to heterosexism, 163 and a history of silence, racism, and classism.

An attempt to define violence, however, might be useful, especially given
the contradictory definitions of violence in the legal and philosophical
scholarship. 165 Violence as a category might be capable of definition
either in the classical sense of a logical system of shared properties, or in
the cognitive sense as prototypically generated. 166 However, violence
itself is often considered ilogical and noncognitive; it is outside the realm
of language so necessary for the act of definition. "Violence is the
supreme gesture of closure toward the other. It constitutes a world of
unreason where discourse is no longer possible." 167 Similarly,
lesbianism may also be illogical and noncognitive; it may be a gesture of
closure toward the other that is male. Lesbianism may be a world of
unreason where discourse with the other is closed to the extent that the
discourse is a dialogic process about lesbianism. 168 But whether
describe.-).
163. The undesirability of defining lesbian is expressed by one lesbian philosopher in her pathbreaking work Lesbian Ethics:
In naming this work 'lesbian,' I invoke a lesbian context. And for this reason, I choose not
to define the term. To define 'lesbian' is, in my opinion, to succumb to a context of
heterosexualism. No one ever feels compelled to explain or define what they perceive as the
norm. If we define 'lesbianism,' we invoke a context in which it is not the norm.
SARAH L HOAOLAND, LESBIAN ETHICS: TowARD NEw VALUE 8 (1988). Hoagland also notes that
defining "lesbian" may also come from a desire to determine "who gets to count" so that we can "defend
our borders from invasion," but that even if we could have a clearly articulated definition of lesbianism,
"it would not serve us in the way we have imagined." Id.
164. See supra notes 14, 17 and accompanying text.
165. For an explicit attempt to define violence, based mostly on dictionary definitions, see Carl
Wellman, Violence, Law and Basic Rights, in JUSTICE, LAw, AND VIOLENCE 170 (James B. Brady &
Newton Carver eds., 1991). For a classic interrogation of violence, especially concerned with
distinguishingviolence from power, see HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE (1969). Other attempts to define
violence preoccupy themselves with the prerequisites for the legitimation of violence. See, e.g., Bernard
Waldenfels, Limits of Legitimation and the Question of Violence, in JUSTICE, LAW, AND VIOLENCE 99
(James B. Brady & Newton Carver eds., 1991). For other important, if somewhat diffuse, definitional
sources, see Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS 277 (Peter Demetz ed. & Edmund
Jephcott trans., 1978) and Derrida, supra note 14.
166. See supranotes 10, 11 and accompanying text (discussing the classical and cognitive theories of
categorization).
167. Richard K. Sherwin, Law, Violence and Illiberal Belief, 78 CEO. L.J. 1785, 1833 (1990).
168. Discourse, reason, and the dialogic process are inextricably related, and are opposed to
irrationality and violence, especially in liberal conceptions of law:
In pursuit of the discourse ideal, liberalism affirms the right of each of us to voice interests
or claims of entitlement in the face of the other's, or the state's, power. This is a right not
only to speak, but also to be heard. For true dialogue can only proceed respectfully, with
each party intent on both understanding and being understood by the other. Accordingly,
persuasion (when it does not deceive) is the hallmark of the dialogic process.
Id. at 1791. CQ David Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 CoLUM. L. PEV.
334 (1991) (arguing that persuasion is a process of appeal to reason, implemented through free speech, and
consistentwith autonomy). The view of law as persuasion obviously conflicts with Richard Posner's view
that while literature may persuade, law operates through coercion. See POSNER, supra note 130, at 249.
Perhaps more interesting, however, is the conflict between Sherwin's, supra note 167, conceptual
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lesbianism is cognitive, linguifiable, unreasonable, or closed, I suggest that

lesbianism must be non-negotiable. This non-negotiability may be enforced
with violence or not, 169 but it is itself violent.

Confronted with our own violence, the learned (domesticated?)
response may be to recoil. This response is specifically enforced by rules
of law that make it criminal to advocate violence against the (male) rule of
law. 170 Our negative response to violence may also be derived from our
experiences as victims and witnesses to male violence. Thus, any new
perspective on violence that urges lesbians to adopt violence may be illegal
and appear to mimic the worst of male values. However, there is a helpful

distinction between

"acceptable and unacceptable violence," 17 ' a

distinction between a violence directed172 at emancipatory change and a

violence directed at conservative order.

opposition of persuasion and violence and the theories of lesbian philosopher Joyce Treblicot, who posits
a adyke method" of nonpersuasion based upon the violent coercion inherent in persuasion, even through
dialogic processes or discourse. See Joyce Treblicot, Dyke Methods, in LESBIAN PHILOSOPHIES AND
CuLTrES 17 (Jeffner Allen ed., 1990).
169. See generaiby MONIQUE WrrnNO, LES GEURIuIun S (1969) (theorizing about the nonnegotiability of lesbianism enforced and protected by violence).
170. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1988), providing:
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty,
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the
United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or
the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the
assassination of any officer of any such government; or
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government,
prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written
or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or
propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence, or attempts to do so; or
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly
of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such
government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such
society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereofShall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or
agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.
If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each
shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and
shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof,
for the five years next following his conviction.
As used in this section, the terms "organizes" and "organize", with respect to any
society, group, or assembly of persons, include the recruiting of new members, the forming
of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of
such society, group, or assembly of persons.
171. Drucilla Cornell, Violnce of the Masquerade, II CARDOZO L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1990).
172. This distinction is loosely based on Jacques Derrida's reading of Walter Benjamin's Critique of
Vioee, in which Derrida distinguishes between the "founding violence" of law, which Benjamin terms
"mythic," the violence that conserves, maintains and enforces law, and the "annihilating violence of
destructive law," which Benjamin terms "divine." Derrida, supra note 14, at 981.
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This distinction is displayed in the physical world in the element of
fire. Like violence, fire can be both good and bad, helpful or harmful.

One's body remembers fire that has warmed and flushed the skin as well
as fire that has burned and curled the flesh. 173 Fire is an image that
recurs in lesbian theory and poetics, a metaphor to describe a lesbian as a
"woman ablaze who is reborn from the essential of what she knows (she)
is." 174
Fire is also an essential element that occurs in lesbian
mythology, a connection between current colloquialisms and ancient
rites. 175 Fire is prominent in lesbian-feminist philosophizing, an image
that permeates lesbian-feminist desire. 176
Fire is identified with women-women to the exclusion of men-177
in almost every cultural tradition. 78 In one tradition, linguified in the
Aboriginal language of Dyirbal, the schematization of reality results in the

173.

Fire transfers itself from burning thing to nearby burnable thing.

Fire is

strongly responsive to wind, and a tiny fire can be encouraged by human
breath. Fire will live in one place if it is periodically given new things to
consume. If constantly attended it can be kept alive indefinitely, neither raging
nor dying.... In times of damp and cold to be just the right distance from a
fire is to be as happy as in golden sunlight; but to be too close or to let it touch
you is terrible, because fire kills and eats living things. Left alone, fire may
dwindle into dark red lumps, increasingly frosted with grey-white ash, but up
to the time of its death it can be brought to life and made as vigorous as ever
by feeding it bits of fire-willing grasses and twigs, and blowing softly upon it.
FRANK RowsoME, A BwrHT AND GLowING PLACE 41 (1973).
174. NICOLE BROssARD, THE AERIAL LETTER 121 (Marlene Wildeman trans., 1988).
175. See JUDY GRAHN, ANOTHER MOTHER TONOUE 235-48, 260-61 (1984) (tracing lesbian and gay
cultural attributes, words, and phrases). Grahn connects the slang term "frig" (to rub a woman's genitals
with the fingers) with the Latin term fi'catrice, meaning "she-who-rubs" in the sense of friction and
firemaking: "The ancient belief was that fire resided in the wood, coming out when the wood was rubbed
in a particular manner and that creative/sexual fire resided in the female pudenda, also coming out when
it was rubbed a certain way." Id. at 236. Grahn also connects the British slang term for a lesbian,
"wick," with the candles used in European witchcraft ceremonies and voodoo rituals: "The wick, that part
of a candle or lamp from which fire can be called forth is . . . the very essence of the female sexualcreative force." Id. at 239.
176. See MARY DALY, PuRE Lusr. ELEMENTAL FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 197-314 (1984) (positing the
"pyrospheres" as the second realm on women's journey to enter "metamorphospheres." According to
Daly, women need to develop themselves as "Volcanic Furies" who practice "pyromachy," a word taken
from the archaic term meaning to fight fire with fire which Daly redefines as "Fighting with Fire/Desire."
Id. at 260; see also MARY DALY wrTH JANE CAPUTI, WEBSTER's FiRST NEw INTEROALACTICVICKEDARY
OF THE ENIOUSH LA1OUAoE 157 (1987) (defining "pyrogenesis" as "the birthing/flaming of Female Fire;
the Sparking of Radical Feminist Consciousness").
177. Women, exclusive of men, are not necessarily lesbians. Nevertheless, the exclusion of men
raises at least an arguable implication of lesbianism in exclusively female enclaves.
178.
World myths, folk traditions, and anthropological studies agree that women
first discovered how to use and produce fire ....
Fire was the tool of tools;
through its use foods could be dried and conserved for future use, and some
poisonous plants and fruits made edible. It was women who developed all the
early associated industries of cooking and ceramics in which fire was the
critical tool.
MONICA SJ66 & BARBARA MOR, THE GREAT COsMIC MOTHER 34-35 (1987).
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category of balan, a category that encompasses women, fire, and objects
of violence.179 This category exists in opposition to three other
categories of experience/language, including the category of bayi that
encompasses men, snakes, and the moon. Cognitive theorists explain the
Aboriginal categorization present in the grammatical structures of Dyirbal
language, 180 using a "domain of experience" theory."" For example,
Aboriginal speakers of Dyirbal link women with fire and danger, and are
capable of explaining these links in a narrative fashion:
"Women is a
182
fire."
is
woman
A
anything.
destroys
'e
destroyer.
Fire is not limited to destruction, however, and fire's creative use is
especially pronounced in Aboriginal culture. Stephen Pyne, a cultural
historian and scholar of fire notes that European colonizers reported a
continent ringed with fire as Aborigines continued their tradition of using
fire to communicate, to travel, to hunt, and, in general, to control their
environment.183 In Australia fire was both singular and universal: "It
was almost everywhere and it was everywhere intensely felt." 184 The
omnipresent firestick carried by the Aborigines symbolized Aboriginal
life.1 85
179. LAxoFF, supra note 10, at 92-95. While taking the title of his book Women, Fire and Dangerous
Tdngs: Wha Categories Reveal About the Human Mind from this example, Lakoff relies on the work of
other anthropological linguists. See, e.g., R.M.W. DIXON, WHERE HAVE ALL THE ADJECTIVES GONE?
(1982) (analyzing the imliortance of inter-language class correspondences and distinctions); ANNETrE
ScHMIDT, YouNa PsoPLE's DYniAu AN EXAMPLE OF LANOUAOE DEATH FROM AUSTRAUA (1985).
180. All languages have categorical structures within their grammar. One of the most familiar
examples to feminists is the category of gender in language. As French lesbian-feminist Monique Witting
observed, gender is a sociological category that permeates grammar and linguistics, especially in the form
of personal pronouns that "are the enforcement of the sex in language." MoNiQuE WrrnNo, The Mark
of ender, in ThE STAtoiHT MIND 76, 79 (1985).
181. LAKors, supra note 10, at 99-100. Lakoff explains domain of experience theory as being a
general principle that there are certain domains of experience that are significant for categorization. Thus,
when categorizing, elements within the same domain of experience will necessarily be in the same
category. For example, fish and fishing implements are within the same domain of experience, so both
would be placed in the same language category. Further clarity is achieved if this is compared with the
classical means of categorization by listing properties.
182. Id. at 100-01 (quoting SCHMIDT, supra note 179). Lakoff does not rest his argument on the
speaker of Dyirbal, however, as he believes that "[n]ative speakers of a language are only sometimes aware
of the principles that structure their language." Id. at 100. For Lakoff, the speaker's statement proves
only that "for this speaker, there is a conceptual link of some kind between the presence of women in the
category and the presence of fire and danger." Id. at 101.
183. STEPHEN J. PYNE, BURNIo BUSH: A FIRE -srORYOPAUSTAUA 136,139 (1991). According
to Pyne:
Fire left no part of Australia untouched, and where Aborigines congregated, in seasonal
gatherings or for more durable residence, free-burning fire proliferated.
"It seems
impossible," Eric Rolls concluded, "to exaggerate the amount of burning in Aboriginal
Australia." The coastal resources of Australia sustained an almost cireumeontinental
settlement; Aboriginal fires ringed the island continent. The most influential of European
explorers, Captain James Cook, referred matter-of-factly to "this continent of smoke."...
That Aborigines burned, and burned extensively, cannot be disputed.
184. Id. at 137.
185. See Id. at 137 ("For the Aborigine, fire was a universal solvent of ecological existence, and the
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The firestick was a symbol not only of the practical effects of fire, but
of the spiritual ones as well. Fire "differentiated the human world from
the nonhuman, yet it bridged the mental world with the material. " 186 It
was an archetype of both the power and danger at the core of human
existence. It was a cognitive center: "[A]s a context, fire invited
contemplation, and as an object, it demanded explanation." 8 7 While the
Aboriginal emphasis on fire may be extraordinary, it is certainly not
188
unique.
Arson is my new perspective on violence, as violence mediates the
relationship between lesbians and law. Slashes are firesticks. Ashes are
our lesbian lives; the law's lies. Having survived the fires of violence set
to extinguish us, we continue to survive as an incendiary category.

&estick,
186.
187.
188.

a universal implement.").
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Stephen Pyne does not limit his comments to Aborigines:

The human revolution that fire helped make possible was ambivalent. Humans were not
genetically programmed to start, preserve, use, explain, or otherwise live with fire, whose
prevalence and power made it a profoundly variegated and even contradictory phenomenon,
ideally positioned to explain and exemplify the specialness and ambivalence of human
existence. So clearly, among the animals, was fire a uniquely human possession that its
origins could be related to the origins of humans, and its exercise to the special duties and
responsibilities incumbent upon humans. The possession of fire-at once both an extraordinary
power and an exceptional danger-was an archetype for human behavior.
Id. at 106. Similarly, other writers on fire note the special status of fire:
Fire is a discontinuity, a chemophysical reaction that, for ancient man [sic], had no
transitional phase. He could not have practiced with almost-fire. Moreover, his mastery of
it is the more remarkable because, at the beginning, fire was very frightening to him.
Almost all animals seem to be endowed with a profound fear of fire.
RowsOME, supra note 173, at 41. See also GASTON BACHELARD, THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF FERE viii
188. (1964) (tracing different fire "complexes" from literary myth: the "Novalis complex," which
deals with the unfallen world and the return of man to his original home; the "Prometheus complex,"
which implies the ascension of man from a human state to a quasi-divine state; and the "Empedocles
complex," which refers to the apolcolyptic destruction of the world by fire); JAMES FRAZER, MYT11S OF
THE ORIGINS OF FIRE 7 (Alan C. M. Ross trans., 1964) ("[F]ire is thus a privileged phenomenon which
can explain anything.").

